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INTRODUCTION

In this era of deregulation and bureaucratic ossification, it is difficult for
contemporary students of the administrative state to conceive of the enthusiasm with which the administrative law cognoscenti embraced informal
rulemaking a mere thirty years ago.' Could Kenneth Culp Davis really
Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
Yale College; J.D., University of Virginia; Ph.D., (history), University of Virginia. A version of this paper was presented at a University of California, Hastings College of the Law
faculty workshop. I would like to thank the participants for their insights. Additionally,
Ash Bhagwat, Dan Ernst, Jeffrey Lubbers, and Aaron Rappaport each read the entire piece
and made extensive and useful comments. Finally, Kevin Knestrick and Akrivi Mazarkis
provided first rate research assistance.
1. For a sampling of the literature on the problems associated with informal rulemaking, including its "ossification," see generally, JERRY L. MASHAW & DAvID L. HAR sT, THE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTo SAFETY 10-14 (1990); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
*

"Deossifing" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1387-437 (1992); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMiN. L. REv. 59 (1995). For

the dissenting views of those who think that informal rulemaking is working as well as
could be expected in a system that requires judicial review, see William S. Jordan, Ill, Ossi-
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have written that "administrative rulemaking is 'one of the greatest inventions of modem govemment"'? 2 This enthusiasm, it turned out, stemmed
from novelty. Although rulemaking had been around for decades, it was
only at the end of the 1960s that agencies turned to it as the primary staple
of administrative action. Thus, hopes and expectations for what was essentially a bureaucratic innovation ran high.
Indeed, when looked at with an eye unjaundiced by hindsight, it is easy
to see the promise of rulemaking. Administrative law specialists had
grown accustomed to agencies that used trial-like adjudications to define
vague statutory terms and develop policy. Like common law courts, agencies developed law incrementally on a case-by-case basis. To critics of the
administrative state, this retrospective method of policy development created uncertainty and promoted arbitrariness. How was a person to know
whether a particular act was allowed or not? What was to prevent agencies
from treating similarly situated people differently?
Additionally, adjudicatory methods of developing public policy seemed
glacially slow. First, the adjudications themselves came with a whole host
of procedural requirements--cross-examinations, trial transcripts, and evidentiary rulings. Second, to develop a whole list of standards (what constituted an unfair trade practice, for example) could take years since the
agency had to find a specific case that allowed it to define a particular standard. Indeed, the facts of any particular case might not even provide the
agency with the information it needed to create the best standard.
Rulemaking, by way of contrast, seemed sleek, efficient, and fair. Issuing rules was like legislating. A vague statutory term could be given content in one fell swoop, rather than through piecemeal adjudications. Because rules had a prospective effect, nobody would be caught off guard.
The agency itself would be bound by them, so it could not act arbitrarily in
a particular case. Even more important was the ease with which the rules
could be created. Rather than engaging in complicated, trial-like proceedings, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) allowed for "notice-andcomment" or "informal" rulemaking.
According to section 553 of the APA, rulemaking was a simple, threestep process. First, an agency announced its intention to issue a rule in the
Federal Register.4 The public was then allowed to submit written comments.5 Finally, the agency would issue the rule with a "concise general
fication Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 393, 393 n. 1(2000) (citing several additional authors therein).
2.

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 448 (2d ed. 1978).

3. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
4. See id. § 553(b).
5.

See id § 553(c).
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statement of [its) basis and purpose." 6 What was most remarkable was
what section 553 did not require: oral hearings, records, and rules of evidence. An agency could seek out the information it needed, apply its own
expertise, and quickly issue regulations that might have taken years to develop in case-by-case adjudications. Viewed this way, it is not surprising
that, by the late 1960s, administrative law theorists and agency personnel
had warmly embraced informal rulemaking.
As with any innovation, however, there was bound to be a reaction. The
judiciary, in its capacity as overseer of the administrative state, would have
to provide its imprimatur for informal rulemaking, and its requirements for
approval would be demanding. The same years that saw the rise of rulemaking also saw an increase in the intensity with which courts oversaw the
administrative process. Thus, in the early 1970s, rulemaking collided with
vigorous judicial review. This Article chronicles that collision. In particular, I will examine how the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia (also known as the D.C. Circuit, the
federal court that reviews a disproportionately large number of agency actions) reacted to this shift to informal rulemaking. I will also explore how
Congress and the agencies themselves responded to both the rise of rulemaking and the judiciary's reaction to it.
By relating this narrative I will demonstrate two things. First, I will
show that the same desire to reform the administrative state generated both
the increase in informal rulemaking and the calls for a more demanding judicial review. Both the agencies and the judiciary reacted in the way that
reformers desired: agencies issued more rules and courts supervised agencies more closely. Yet, the two responses were often contradictory. Vigorous judicial review limited the speed and efficiency of informal rulemaking. Consequently, the reform impulse was frustrated.
Second, I will explain the causes of the contentious debate that arose
among and within the different branches of the federal government about
what the appropriate response to the rise of informal rulemaking should be.
A fascinating combination of politics, institutional self-interest, and legal
culture influenced members of Congress, agency officials, and, particularly, the judges of the D.C. Circuit as they developed strategies for coping
with this novel form of administrative action. The D.C. Circuit's reaction
to the rise of rulemaking illustrates the way in which judges transform the
abstract principles that make up legal culture (assumptions, for example,
about what a judge's role in a democratic government should be) into actual legal doctrines.
Section I of this Article describes the rise of rulemaking in the 1960s and

6. Id.
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1970s. It links this rise to a potent critique of the administrative state that
emerged at the beginning of the 1960s. Critics described agencies as arbitrary, inefficient, and inevitably captured by the interests they were supposed to regulate. Quick, efficient, informal rulemaking, which resulted in
comprehensive and comprehensible rules, was proffered as a way to solve
these problems. Many critics of the administrative state also suggested that
increased judicial scrutiny of administrative action was another solution.
This section concludes with a discussion of several Supreme Court cases,
from the late 1960s and early 1970s, in which the Court endorsed both
remedies.
Section 11 continues the narrative. It examines how three institutionsthe D.C. Circuit, Congress, and the agencies themselves-reacted to these
remedies. Section II.A. describes the D.C. Circuit's reaction. In particular,
it chronicles a heated debate among the judges over the manner in which
courts should review rulemaking. One faction supported intense substantive review of agency rules. The other thought that only procedural supervision of agencies was appropriate. Courts, these judges argued, should
ensure that agencies used procedures sufficient to guarantee that they had
engaged in reasoned decision making, but should avoid judging the substantive outcome of the rulemaking process. This was a debate that, in the
short run, both sides won.
Thus, between 1970 and 1978, the D.C. Circuit engaged in intense judicial review of the substance of agency rules and placed significant procedural requirements on agencies that were above and beyond anything mandated by the APA. Section II.B. demonstrates how, at the same time,
Congress responded to the rise of rulemaking in a manner similar to that of
the D.C. Circuit. The legislation that created new administrative regimes
during the 1970s mandated both increased judicial scrutiny of agency actions and additional procedural requirements for rulemaking.
Section II.C. shows how the agencies attempted to retain their own
autonomy by resisting the proceduralization of the rulemaking process. In
particular, this Section chronicles the attempts of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to persuade Congress and the courts
to stop second-guessing agency decisions about what were the best procedures for rulemaking. Section II.D. concludes my narrative. It recounts
how the Supreme Court put an end to this debate by forbidding courts from
adding to the procedural requirements of the APA. It also argues that despite this gesture in the direction of agency autonomy, by the end of the
1970s, the intensity of the federal judiciary's substantive review had impeded the efficiency and informality of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The reform impulse to control the administrative state through judicial review had trumped the reform impulse to free administration from the

HeinOnline -- 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1142 2001

20011

RULEMAKING 'S PROMISE

1143

shackles of adjudicative policy-making.
Having laid out this narrative, I turn to the issue of causation in Section
III. Why did Congress, the judiciary, and the agencies themselves react to
the rise of rulemaking the way they did? Politics, to be sure, played some
role. A Democratic Congress and a federal judiciary dominated by Democratic appointees sought to weaken Republican presidents by asserting judicial and legislative control over executive agencies. However, I will argue that partisan impulses cannot explain the complexity of the debate. In
particular, they do not explain the division on the D.C. Circuit, where politically like-minded judges differed dramatically in their approaches to judicial supervision of the administrative process. Instead, I argue that the
debate over the proper response to the rise of rulemaking is best understood
by examining the institutional interests of Congress, the courts, and the
agencies; interests in strengthening their institutions that were autonomous
of any particular policy preference.
Additionally, I will suggest that a split in the legal culture of the time
largely drove the debate on the D.C. Circuit. The judges had different images of the proper role for the judiciary in a democratic society. Some
members of the D.C. Circuit embraced a vision of judging that encouraged
judicial activism in the service of social justice. For others, such activism
was anti-democratic. Instead, they argued that courts should limit themselves to institutionally appropriate, procedurally oriented solutions to the
social problems that they encountered. The judges, I believe, reified these
images of the judicial role, turning them into legal doctrines that shaped the
development of administrative law in the 1970s and continue to today.
I.

THE RISE OF RULEMAKING

The idea of the agency life-cycle is a common one among scholars who
study the administrative state.7 Agencies begin their lives full of youthful
vigor, anxious to set right the wrong that they were created to address.
They battle with the interest groups that opposed their creation, develop
creative solutions to the public policy problems within their portfolio, and
actively attempt to expand their power and jurisdiction.8 As agencies reach
maturity, they settle into a routine. Conflict with the regulated is replaced
with a more cooperative approach. Creative solutions to particular prob-

7. Marver H. Bernstein developed the idea in REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
CorwNussIoN 74-102 (1955). For contemporary references, see, for example, Ronald A.
Cass, Trade Subsidy Law: Can A Foolish Inconsistency Be Good Enough For Government
Work?, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 609, 616 n.33 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional
Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 959, 960 n.2 (1997).
8. See BERNsTEiN, supra note 7, at 79-86.
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lems are replaced with an increasing emphasis on precedent. Agencies are
more likely to view their responsibilities narrowly, avoiding creative solutions to particular problems and instead following precedent and encouraging stability. 9 Finally, agencies pass into old age. Routine adherence to
precedent becomes debilitating apathy. The agency's original objectives
are forgotten, as is its ability to adapt to new economic, technological, or
social environments. Instead, these senile agencies fall under the control of
the entities they were originally created to regulate.' 0
The agency life-cycle is a historical as well as a theoretical phenomenon.
It is possible to identify specific periods of youthful vigor, adult quiescence, and aged decrepitude for a particular regulatory regime. For many
federal agencies created during the New Deal, the late 1950s were an era of
increasing senescence. Accusations of inefficiency, corruption, and capture
became commonplace." Indeed, Princeton University political scientist
Marver Bernstein introduced the idea of the agency life-cycle in this period.12 Even some of the most stalwart defenders of the administrative
state, such as James Landis, began to note that the problems of agency obsolescence had tarnished the luster with which expertise-based administration had gleamed during the halcyon days of the New Deal.13 Landis himself conducted an exhaustive examination of the federal regulatory agencies
for president-elect John F. Kennedy, and his recommendations became the
basis for a rejuvenation of the administrative state in the 1960s.
There were many causes of this rebirth. From within the Kennedy administration came an interest in the workings of the administrative state
that had been missing during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.
Kennedy also began appointing higher quality personnel than had populated the agencies during the 1950s.14 From Congress came larger appropriations 5 and a considerable increase in responsibility as the federal government expanded its regulatory activities.' 6 Additionally, in the 1960s,

9. See id. at 86-91.
10. Seeid. at91-95.
!1. See THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FKNciS ADAMS,
Louis D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 217-219 (1984); Reuel E. Schiller,
Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of
Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1389, 1410-13, 1444 (2000).
12. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 74-102.
13.

See JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-

ELECT (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter LANDIS REPORT]; McCRAw, supra note i1, at 219.
14. See McCRAw, supra note 11, at 220.
15. Seeid
16. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text; see also Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1272-75 (1986).
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Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 17 and, at the end
of the decade, the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969
(NEPA)18 , both of which sought to improve the quality of administrative
action by exposing it to public scrutiny.' 9 Pressures from outside of the
political branches also contributed to the reinvigorated administrative state
of the 1960s and early 1970s. Public interest lawyers increasingly policed
agency actions and sympathetic federal courts changed various administrative law doctrines in 20ways that forced agencies to become more responsive
to the public at large.
One of the key innovations that grew out of these efforts to reinvigorate
the federal administrative apparatus was an increase in the use of rulemaking by federal agencies. Before the 1960s agencies acted mainly through
case-by-case adjudications. Most traditional administrative actions-ratemaking, for example-were based on judicial models. 21 Administrative
proceedings looked like mini-trials, where the rights of individual actors
were adjudicated. Indeed, in the initial conflicts between courts and the
emerging administrative state at the beginning of the century, the judiciary
for trespassing on
reprimanded agencies for behaving too much like courts,
22
functions.
judicial
usurping
or
prerogatives,
judicial
The dramatic expansion of the administrative state brought about by the
New Deal did not alter this preference for adjudication. Rulemaking by
agencies played only a minor role in New Deal administration. To be sure,
certain agencies, particularly the Federal Reserve and the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor, spent a substantial amount of their
time issuing rules.23 Nevertheless, the vast majority of agencies acted primarily through adjudication. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), and the Social Security Administration (SSA), for example, only is-

17. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1994)).
18. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1994)).
19. See Schiller, supranote 11, at 1444-46.
20. See id.at 1410-43.
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL ON THE ADMIN. PROCEDURE
ACT 32-34 (1947) [hereinafter ATr'Y GEN.'S MANUAL].
22. For the Supreme Court's classic articulation of this principle, see Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). For other examples, see Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), and Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minn.,
134 U.S. 418 (1890).
23. See generally Arr'Y GE.'s COMM. ON ADMt. PRoc., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
FEDERAL RESERVE Sys., MONOGRAPH 9; ATT'Y GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PRoC., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ADMiN. OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, MONOGRAPH 12.
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sued rules of practice, related to how adjudicatory cases were to be brought
before the agency. 24 Other agencies, such as the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
Civil Aeronautics Administration, and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), issued substantive rules, but devoted only a small percentage of
agency resources to that activity7 25 For example, a Roosevelt administration study of the federal administrative apparatus devoted a mere twentyfive pages of a 350-page monograph on the SEC to the Commission's
rulemaking activities. 26
Rulemaking's lack of importance was also evidenced by the nature of
the complaints people had about the post-war administrative state. Those
critics of the Roosevelt administration, who aggressively pushed for the
passage of the APA, focused their energies on making agency adjudications
more like common law trials.27 Agency rulemaking was essentially ignored. Indeed, the minimalist requirements of section 553 were suggested
by the American Bar Association's (ABA's) Special Committee on Administrative Law, one of the most vocal critics of New Deal-era administrative procedure. 28 Rulemaking was simply not important enough to stir
the ire of the proponents of administrative reform in the way that ad hoc
adjudicatory development of policy did. Similarly, the blue ribbon panels
assembled by presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, to examine federal administrative procedure in 1953 and 1961, focused their attention and recommendations exclusively on agency adjudications not rulemaking. 29 The

24. See ATT'Y GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PRoc., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N, MONOGRAPH 6, 54, 65-73; ATT'Y GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, MONOGRAPH 18, 6 n. 1; ATT'Y
GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL POWER COMM'N,
MONOGRAPH 25, 94-97.
25. See ATr'y GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, MONOGRAPH 3, 65-73; Arr'Y GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMI. PROC.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS AuT., MONOGRAPH 19, 137-43; ATr'Y
GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N,

MONOGRAPH 24, 185-200; A'rr' GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, MONOGRAPH 26, 279-304 [hereinafter MONOGRAPH

26].
26. See MONOGRAPH 26, supra note 25, at 279-304.
27. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 452-53
(1986); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emergesfrom New Deal Politics,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1575, 1635-36, 1644 (1996).
28. See Shepherd, supranote 27, at 1650-51.
29. See PRESDENT's CONFERENCE ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, REPORT (1954) [hereinafter
REPORT); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT (1962) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT]. The only references to rulemaking in both these reports are suggestions that
agencies issue procedural rules to guide litigants before agency adjudicative tribunals. See
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ABA's Committee on Administrative Law-perhaps the most consistent
and toughest critic of the federal administrative apparatus-did not even
have a subcommittee on rulemaking until 1958.3o
Beginning in the 1960s federal agencies' neglect of rulemaking began to
decline, gradually at first and then with such speed that by the early 1970s
commentators declared that the administrative state had entered the "age of

rulemaking." 31 Statistics bear out this assertion.

In 1960, the Federal

Register recorded 498 notices of proposed rulemaking, or about 41 per
month. 32 Between September 1966 and April 1967-the first period in
which the ABA's Administrative Law Section tracked notices-that number had jumped to 86 per month. 33 The following twelve-month period saw
the number increase to 115 per month.34 After a small dip in 1968 and
1969, it rose to 136 per month by the end of 1970, to 142 per month by
1972, and then to 35over 190 per month in 1974, where it remained for the
rest of the decade.
Anecdotal evidence corroborates these raw numbers. In the 1960s the
FTC, the FPC, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) each undertook the first substantive rulemakings in their history. Previously each
agency had operated solely through adjudications, approving drugs, setting
natural gas prices, and defining unfair trade practices on a case-by-case basis. In 1960, the FPC began to set rates by region.3 6 Two years later the
FTC established a Division of Trade Regulations and Rules and began proalso supra REPORT at 14-35; supra FINAL REPORT at 41.
30. See Ralph F. Fuchs, Report of the Committee on Agency Rule Making, 10 ADMIN.
L. BULL. 128 (1958).
31. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 376 (1974). Many commentators have noted this shift,
but none have attempted to document it empirically. See Kenneth C. DAvis & RiCHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINSTRATIvE LAW TREATISE 21-23 (3rd ed. 1994); Alan B. Morrison, The
Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 253, 254
(1986); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J.
38 (1975-76).
32. 1 generated this number by counting the number of notices of proposed rulemaking
in the 1960 FederalRegisterAnnual Codification Guide and dividing by twelve.
33. See 4 ABA SEC. ADMIN. L. ANNUAL REPORTS OF COMMS. 18-21 (1967).
34. See 5 ABA SEC. ADMIN. L. ANNUAL REPORTS OF CoMMs. 26-29 (1968).
35. This figures come from examining ABA Section on Administrative Law Annual
Reports from 1968 through 1979. For some reason, the Committee did not collect statistics
for the 1973-1974 Report or for the 1976-1977 Report. See 6 ABA ANNUAL REPORT 10-12

(1969); 7 ABA

ANNUAL REPORT

19-21 (1970), 8 ABA

ANNUAL REPORT

14-16 (1971); 9

ABA ANNUAL REPORT 17-19 (1972); 10 ABA ANNUAL REPORT 58-61 (1973); 12 ABA
ANNUAL REPORT 27-31 (1975); 13 ABA ANNUAL REPORT 31-36 (1976); 15 ABA ANNUAL
REPORT 48-51 (1978); 16 ABA ANNUAL REPORT 21-25 (1979).
36. See FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL ANNUAL REPORT 8
(1977) [hereinafter FPC FINAL ANNUAL REPORT].
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spectively defining deceptive trade practices.3 7 In 1966 the FDA began the
process of establishing standards for drug efficacy.3 8
Even as these venerable agencies began rulemaking, the new administrative regimes created by Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s required agencies to use rulemaking from the very beginning of their existence. Congress obligated newly created agencies such as the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1966), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1970), or the Consumer Products Safety Commission
(1972) to issue regulations defining the standards relevant to their operations-vehicle safety standards, clear air and water standards, and product
safety standards, respectively.39 Similarly, when traditional agencies were

given new functions, such as the Department of Labor's powers under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) or the FTC's powers under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (1975), they were expected to exercise
them using rulemakings.4 °
There are a number of reasons for this dramatic increase in rulemaking.
In part it was simply a response to ever increasing caseloads. When the
Supreme Court held that thousands of independent natural gas producers
were subject to FPC regulation, the Commission responded by engaging in
its first rulemaking. 4' Similarly, the FDA's initial rulemakings were triggered by Congress's decision to dramatically expand the agency's jurisdiction in the early 1960s. The 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act required the FDA to engage in pre-marketing review of drug
efficacy in addition to its traditional task of ensuring drug safety.42 This
37. See 1962 FED. TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. 35-36; William F. West, The Politics of
Administrative Rulemaking, 42 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 420 (1982).
38. Though the FDA did not begin actual rulemaking until 1969, it established industry-wide standards for drug efficacy in 1966. See Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug
Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185, 208-12 (1971-72); Charles C. Ames & Steven C.
McCracken, Framing Regulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: The FDA As a
Case Study, 64 CAL. L. REv. 14, 17-20 (1976).
39. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, §
103, 80 Stat. 718, 719-20 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1994)); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109(a), 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 7401-7405 (1994 & Supp. V 2000)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 303, 86 Stat. 816, 846-50 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 7,
86 Stat. 1207, 1212-15 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1994)).
40. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6, 84 Stat.
1590, 1593-97 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1994)); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat.
2183, 2193-98 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 46-57a (1994 & Supp. V 2000)).
41. See FPC FINAL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 36.
42. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §
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involved examining at least one hundred new drugs per year as well as going back to test the 2,800 drugs that it had approved in the years since
43
Rulemaking also increased because Congress began exWorld War II.
tending the reach of the administrative state into new areas-particularly
consumer and environmental protection. Case-by-case adjudications were
simply too inefficient for implementing these new, massive regulatory regimes. Thus, agency caseloads increased not only as old agencies responded to a rapidly growing economy but as Congress created new agencies with enormous mandates.
Ironically, these increasing demands on agencies began at the same time
as criticisms of the administrative state escalated. Beginning in the early
1960s, federal administrative agencies were under attack from a wide variety of critics. Increasingly, critics on the left and the right portrayed agencies as inefficient, incompetent, and often captured by the interests they
were supposed to regulate."4 Some of the best known scholars in the area,
such as Louis Jaffe, Kenneth Culp Davis, and Bernard Schwartz, fretted
about the vitality of the federal administrative apparatus, as did judges and,
most significantly, administrators themselves. 45 Marver Bernstein's era of
administrative senility had been reached and this environment generated an
impulse to make rules.
This impulse was best articulated by Henry Friendly, a Judge on the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in the 1962 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures at Harvard Law School. 6 Entitled "The FederalAdministrative
Agencies: The Need for a Better Definition of Standards," the lectures had
a simple thesis: "A prime source of justified dissatisfaction with.., federal
administrative action . ..is the failure to develop standards sufficiently
definite to permit decisions to be fairly predictable and the reasons for them
to be understood .... ",4 The failure, Judge Friendly believed, had resulted
in a host of problems that had become endemic to the administrative state.
In the absence of particular standards, agencies behaved in an arbitrary

102(a-b), § 105(d), 76 Stat. 780, 781, 785-86 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 355, 357
(1994 & Supp. V 2000)).
43. See Note, supra note 38, at 207, 210 n. 160.
44. See Schiller, supranote 11, at 1410-16.
45. See generally LANDIS REPORT, supra note 13; KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINrION OF STANDARDS

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATrvE ACTION 10-27 (1965); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv.

(1962); Louis L. JAFFE,

1390 (1955).
46. See generally FRIENDLY, supranote 45.
47. Id. at 5-6.
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fashion, treating similarly situated people differently. 48 Aside from simply
being unfair, this unpredictable, unconstrained agency behavior had a number of other negative consequences. It stifled economic transactions by
limiting the extent to which actors could rely on agencies to behave consistently. 49 It also limited the ability of the political branches to hold agencies accountable for their actions because it was so difficult to figure out
what a particular agency's policies were, let alone object to them. 50 Finally, the lack of clearly defined standards encouraged agency capture:
"Lack of definite standards creates a void into which attempts to influence
are bound to rush ....,51When agency choices were "under no legal control," nothing could limit administrative actors from simply following the
self-serving dictates of the regulated.52
Judge Friendly concluded his lectures with a host of prescriptions for reform-methods of ensuring that agencies' actions were based on extant
standards. These included stronger presidential leadership and more specific delegations of power from Congress, though he doubted that either institution would be able to set the type of standards that were necessary. 53
Most of the reform, Judge Friendly believed, would have to come from
within the agencies themselves. Like Landis, Judge Friendly hoped that the
Kennedy administration would appoint a higher caliber of administrative
officials than President Eisenhower had. 54 The most important reform that
the agencies could undertake, however, was to de-emphasize policymaking through case-by-case adjudications and instead shift to the definition of standards through policy statements and rulemakings. 5s Indeed, this
was one of the most common recommendation of all the critics who examined the administrative state at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the
1960s. 56 If the apparati of government had fallen into a malaise, rulemak48. See id. at 19-20.
49. See id, at 20.
50. See id. at 21-22.
51.

d. at 22.

52. See FRIENDLY, supra note 45, at 22-23.
53. See id. at 147-73.
54. See id.
at 142.
55. See id. at 143-47.
56. See, e.g., LANDIS REPORT, supra note 13, at 22-24, 42-46; Ralph F. Fuchs, Agency
Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 781, 781 nn.2-4, 788
nn.47-48 (1965); Cornelius J.Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
orAdjudication in the Development ofAdministrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965);
see also DAVIS, supra note 45, at 102, 219-21; THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 299-300 (1969); EMMETTE S.
REDFORD, NATIONAL REGULATORY COMMIssIoNs: NEED FOR A NEW LOOK (1959); I1
ADMIN. L. BuLL. 276-77 (1959); 12 ADMIN L.BULL. 181 (1960).
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ing was a solution.
Thus, by the middle of the 1960s, the conditions for the rulemaking explosion had fallen into place. Economic growth and legislative ambition
had created a demand for rulemaking. At the same time, the contemporary
critique of agencies had provided a theoretical justification for its increased
use. What remained to be seen was how the administrative state's traditional antagonist, the judiciary, would react.
Federal courts, as it turned out, were not in the least bit hostile to rulemaking. They consistently upheld agency rulemaking powers, even in instances when it was unclear that Congress intended to grant an agency such
powers. 57 A number of times in the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts actually required agencies to engage in rulemakings when they had proceeded
solely through adjudications. 58 In two cases from the early 1970s, the Supreme Court enthusiastically endorsed a presumption that when agencies
engaged in policy-making activities, they do so through informal rulemaking.
Both cases, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.59 and United
States v. FloridaEast CoastRailway Co.,60 involved challenges to rules issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). In each case, the railroads argued that promulgation of the rules violated the Interstate Commerce Act, the APA, and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
because they were issued using the informal procedures of section 553.
These regulations, the railroads argued, had a deleterious impact on specific parties. Accordingly, full, formal adjudicatory procedures were required so those injured parties could defend their own interests. The court
rejected these arguments. Taking a page from Judge Friendly's lectures,
the Court held that trial-like adjudications were simply not the best way to
generate the broad public policy:
While the line dividing [rulemakings and adjudications] may not always be a bright
one, [our] decisions represent a recognized distinction in administrative law between
proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the
one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on
the other.

57. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
951 (1974).

58. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc.
v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), rev d. 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Holmes v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163,
167-68 (7th Cir. 1969); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964).
59. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
60. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
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Here, the incentive payments... were applicable across the board to all of the common carriers by railroad subject to the Interstate Commerce Act ....
The factual inferences were used in the formulation of a basically legislative-type judgment, for
prospective
application only, rather than in adjudicating a particular set of disputed
61
facts.

Thus, absent specific instructions from Congress, when agencies formed
broad policies, informal rulemaking was all that the APA or the Constitution required. "Because the proceedings under review were an exercise of
legislative rulemaking power rather than adjudicatory hearings... the provisions of [the APA requiring adjudicatory procedures] were inapplica62
ble."
The Supreme Court's embrace of informal rulemaking should not be
confused with a decision to remove the judiciary from the administrative
process. While the Court reacted to the growth of rulemaking by encouraging it, it also sought to ensure that the judiciary controlled it. The first
step the Supreme Court took in guaranteeing judicial control over rulemaking was to accelerate the process by which agency rulemakings got to
court to be reviewed. Traditionally, courts reviewed the substance of rulemakings during an enforcement action.63 Since many regulatory statutes
only permitted judicial review of final orders-that is, the results of a particular adjudication-courts frequently held that pre-enforcement review of
rules was forbidden.64 Even in instances where the substantive statute did
not preclude pre-enforcement review of rules, courts often declined to do
so because of ripeness concerns. 65 Absent the application of a rule to a
particular party "an appellate court has no intelligible basis for decision,"
wrote the D.C. Circuit, denying a petition to review a FPC rule.66 "[W]e
are asked ... to make an important decision concerning the scope of the
Commission's regulatory authority .... It is clear to us that decisions of
this kind cannot be made in vacuo ...... 67
In 1967, the Supreme Court dismissed these fears and ordered the Courts
of Appeal to engage in pre-enforcement review of most rules. In Abbott
Laboratoriesv. Gardner,68 the Court permitted pre-enforcement review of
61. Id. at 245-46.
62. Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. at 757.
63. See Paul R. Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185,
196-205 (1974).
64. See id. at 196-97.
65. See id. at 202 n.78.
66. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 181 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
67. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 181 F.2d at 799.
68. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See also, Abbott Labs., companion case, Toilet Goods Ass n
v. Gardner,387 U.S. 158 (1967).
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several FDA rules regarding drug labeling and cosmetic additives. Ripeness doctrine, the Court reasoned, was designed to prevent courts "from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties." 69 Since the rules had been issued, there
was no doubt that the agency's policy was settled and not abstract. 70 Furthermore, the effects of the rulemaking would be felt by the regulated well
before the government started an enforcement action against a particular
party. Either they must pay the costs of complying with a regulation they
believed to be unlawful or they must risk prosecution. 71 Thus, federal
courts were not to wait until a rule was enforced to examine its validity.
Since the rule was concrete and the potential damage impending, they
should step in right away.
By endorsing pre-enforcement review, the Supreme Court not only accelerated the judiciary's involvement in the administrative process, it increased the intensity of that involvement as well. When a court's review of
a rule was merely ancillary to a particular enforcement action, its attention
was focused less on the process by which the rule was created and more on
the application of the rule to the particular facts of the case before it.7 2 As
one commentator put it, "review of the circumstances surrounding the
rule's enactment [is] secondary and somewhat obscured by time."' 3 Preenforcement review, on the other hand, focused the court's attention on the
rulemaking itself, devoid of the distractions that a particular application of
the rule might create.
If the effect of Abbott Labs., unintended or not, was to increase the scrutiny with which courts reviewed informal rulemakings, the Supreme Court
soon made explicit its desire for vigorous review of informal agency action.
In 1971, the Court decided Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe.74 Overton Park involved the Secretary of Transportation's decision
to authorize federal funds for the construction of a highway through a park
in Memphis, Tennessee. A citizens group argued that the Highway Act of
1968 prohibited the use of Department of Transportation funds to build

69. Id. at 148-49.
70. See id. at 152.

71. See id. at 152-53.
72. See Verkuil, supra note 63, at 205; Pierce, supra note 1, at 89; MASHAW & HAarST,
supra note 1,at 246-47.
73. Verkuil, supra note 63, at 205.
74. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). For a particularly thoughtful reading of this case with respect
to the rise of informal rulemaking, see James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REv. 257, 262-65 (1979).

HeinOnline -- 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1153 2001

1154

ADMINISTRATIVE LA W RE VIEW

[53:4

highways through parks unless no other route was "feasible and prudent"
and that the Secretary had failed to make such a finding. 75 The Highway
Act, however, did not require the Secretary to make formal findings.
Nonetheless, the Court overturned the Secretary's decision. It then remanded the case to the district court, which was to generate a record of the
Secretary's decision making process, even if doing so meant requiring
agency officials to testify as to their thinking at the time they made the decision. This record, the Court stated, should then be reviewed in a "thorough, probing, [and] in-depth" manner.76 Indeed, the district court was to
engage in "plenary review of the Secretary's decision. 7 7
Though Overton Park involved an adjudication,78 its holding, along with
FloridaEast Coast Railway, Allegheny-Ludlum, and Abbott Labs., sent a
coherent message about the Court's reaction to the rise of informal rulemaking: it was to be encouraged, but intensely reviewed. Indeed, each set
of cases represents a different approach to solving the problems associated
with the critique of the administrative state that emerged during the 1960s.
By encouraging rulemaking, Florida East Coast Railway and AlleghenyLudlum endorsed the idea that increased rulemaking was an effective
method for limiting agency abuses of power and increasing agency efficiency. Abbott Labs. and Overton Park, on the other hand, represented a
different solution to the much-publicized problems of the administrative
state. If administrative agencies were running amuck, courts should be
used to reign them in.
This line of thinking emerged from the same circumstances that generated calls for increased rulemaking. The idea that the judiciary, through
intense judicial review, should control the abuses of the administrative state
was not a new one. Since the founding of the first state-level administrative agencies, the most vociferous critics of regulation demanded that
agency actions be judged by courts.79 Many conservative attacks on the
New Deal took this form, denouncing "administrative absolutism," attacking agencies' odd place within the three branches, and demanding their
subordination to the judiciary8 0 When, in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
75. Overton Park,401 U.S. at 405.
76. Id. at415.
77. Id. at 420.
78. Although the Court stated this explicitly, the prospective effects of agency action
certainly make it plausible to argue that this was a rulemaking. See id. at 414.
79. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRIsIs OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 216-22 (1992); McCRAw, supra note 11, at 57-65;
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 248-67 (1982); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE

96-97 (2000).
80. See HORWITZ, supra note 79, at 219-22, 225-30; see also Shepherd, supra note 27,

CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL
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the administrative state was struck with another round of attacks, similar
demands emerged, this time from the other end of the political spectrum.
Close judicial supervision of the administrative process could prevent arbitrary administrative action and agency capture. Thus, a panoply of liberal
academics and legal activists, such as Charles Reich, Joseph Sax, John
Denvir, Robert Fellmeth, and Simon Lazarus, claimed that only increased
judicial involvement in the administrative process could ensure that agencies actually represented the public interest.8' Nor did this demand emerge
solely from younger, more radical thinkers. Louis Jaffe, Kenneth Culp
Davis, Bernard Schwartz, and Henry Friendly-hardly members of the
New Left-each advocated for an expansion of the courts' role in the administrative process. 82
Thus, by the beginning of the 1970s two potent medicines to cure the
maladies of the administrative state were in place. The Supreme Court had
endorsed both a dramatic increase in rulemaking and stricter, more vigorous judicial review of administrative action. This placed the lower federal
judiciary in a peculiar position. For the first time since the 1930s, the Supreme Court was calling on it to exercise strict control over the administrative process.8 3 At the same time, courts were faced with the widespread
use of rulemaking, a mode of administrative action with which they were
unfamiliar. As the 1970s wore on, it would become clear that these two
impulses-for more rulemaking and for intense judicial review-were in
conflict.
II. REACTIONS TO THE RISE OF RULEMAKING
A. Rulemaking and the D.C. Circuit
The judiciary's initial reaction to this new situation was simply to ignore
the fact that rulemaking was different from adjudication and scrutinize the
substance of rules more carefully than they had before. Appellate courts,
and particularly the D.C. Circuit, which reviewed the lion's share of agency
decisions, were familiar with the idea of deploying more or less strict scrutiny of administrative adjudications-de novo review versus substantial
evidence review versus arbitrary and capricious review." Thus, it was not
at 1569-72, 1590-92.
81. See Schiller, supra note 11, at 1414-16.
82. See id.

83. For a discussion of the laxness of judicial review of administrative action during
the 1950s, despite the Court's famous Universal Camera case, see ibid. at 1420-21. In
1978, Kenneth Culp Davis argued that the factual basis for rulemaking went essentially unreviewed until 1970. DAvis, supra note 2, at 449.
84. Up until the middle of the 1980s, substantial evidence review was considered to be
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difficult, at least as a matter of theory, to increase the intensity with which
they reviewed rulemaking. Consequently, "hard look review" was born.
The phrase "hard look review" originated the year before Overton Park,
in a 1970 D.C. Circuit opinion authored by Judge Harold Leventhal,
GreaterBoston Television Corp. v. FCC.8 5 Judge Leventhal suggested that
in reviewing administrative actions, courts had a duty to do more than simply check that agencies had followed the procedural requirements of the
APA and ensure that they were acting within the powers that Congress had
delegated to them. "[The judiciary's] supervisory function calls on the
court to intervene... if the court becomes aware... that the agency has
not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasoned decision-making." 86 Judge Leventhal argued that the
judiciary had the responsibility to scrutinize the substance of agency decision making-the nuts and bolts of an agency's action-to protect the public's interest in rational agency behavior. While the language of his opinion indicated that courts were only to determine whether agencies had
themselves taken a "hard look" at the data relevant to a particular decision,
it was not a long road from Judge Leventhal's declaration that courts ensure agencies take a hard look to the courts taking that hard look themselves.
Though GreaterBoston involved a formal adjudication, the judges of the
D.C Circuit quickly applied the principles of hard look review to informal
actions. Two cases from 1973, International Harvester Co. v.Ruckelshaus87 and PortlandCement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,8 best illustrate this
phenomenon. Both cases involved industry challenges to environmental
regulations promulgated by the EPA. In InternationalHarvester,the court
overturned the EPA's decision not to issue a one-year suspension of the
Clean Air Act's emissions requirements. 89 Judge Leventhal, the opinion's
author, repeatedly acknowledged that courts did not possess the technical
expertise to analyze the two factual issues in the case: the EPA's determinations that, first, the environmental harms caused by automobile emissions
outweighed the economic harm of not delaying implementation; and, seca more demanding standard than arbitrary and capricious. See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
85. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Though the phrase originated with GreaterBoston,
that was not the first D.C. Circuit case to embody the principles of hard look review. See,
e.g., Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
86. GreaterBoston, 444 F.2d at 851.
87. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
88. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
89. See 478 F.2d at 647-50.
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ond, that existing technology would allow automobile manufacturers to
meet the Act's emission standards. 90 Nevertheless, citing GreaterBoston,
he asserted that it was the court's duty to examine the record, "even as to
the evidence on technical and specialized matters," so as to ensure that the
agency had engaged in reasoned decision making. 91 And examine he did,
for over fifteen pages.92 Similarly, in PortlandCement, the D.C. Circuit
overturned an EPA rulemaking limiting stationary source emissions by cement plants with another fifteen-page study of the chemistry and engineering of the industry. 93 "While we remain diffident in approaching problems
of this technical complexity," Judge Leventhal wrote for the court, "the necessity to review agency decisions, if it is to be more than a meaningless
exercise, requires enough steeping in technical matters
to determine
94
"
discretion.
reasoned
a
exercised
'has
agency
the
whether
Even as the intense substantive scrutiny of hard look review gravitated
from the formal, adjudicatory context of its birth to the increasingly popular realm of informal rulemaking, judges and academic commentators began to doubt its efficacy. Rulemakings differed dramatically from adjudications in the scope of the issues they tackled, in the breadth of their effect,
and in their predictive, rather than responsive nature. Consequently, hard
look review, which might be appropriate for the easily cabined facts of a
single adjudication, might not work as well when applied to rulemakings.
The Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, David Bazelon, articulated this view
in his concurrence in the InternationalHarvestercase:
Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one does not know. I may
be wise if that is wisdom, because I recognize that I do not know enough about dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide
95
whether or not the government's approach to these matters was statistically valid.

Like Judge Leventhal, Chief Judge Bazelon recognized that the increasing
use of rulemaking and the increasingly controversial subject matter of rules
called for a change in the way courts and agencies interacted. 96 However,
Chief Judge Bazelon believed that Congress did not wish courts to "delve
into the substance of the mechanical, statistical, and technological disputes
in this case." 97 Courts had to be aware of "the limits of our own compe-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at 633, 641, 647.
Id. at 648 (quoting GreaterBoston, 444 F.2d at 850).
See id. at 633-48.
See 486 F.2d at 387-401.
Id. at 402 (quoting GreaterBoston, 444 F.2d at 850).
478 F.2d at 650-5 1.
See id at 651.

97. Id.
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tence . . . ."98 The problem with hard look review was that regardless of
how much energy judges put into the task, they would never have the expertise to understand the issues presented in a case like InternationalHarvester.
Chief Judge Bazelon did not, however, throw up his hands. Instead, he
offered a procedural solution. While courts should avoid "dig[ging] deeper
into the technical intricacies of an agency's decision," they should instead
require agencies to follow procedures that result in a more thorough airing
of the contested issues.99 Methodological decisions and technical evaluations should not be challenged on judicial review. Rather, courts should
force agencies to use procedures that will result in them being challenged
before judicial review. These procedures would ensure that "complex
questions [were] resolved in the crucible of debate through the clash of informed but opposing scientific and technological viewpoints."' 0 0 Chief
Judge Bazelon analogized the administrative process to Justice Holmes'
famous marketplace of ideas:
[T]he best way for courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative
decisions... is to establish a decision making process which assures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the public.

"[Tihe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." If we were to require procedures in this case that opened the
Administrator's decision to challenge and forced him to respond, we could rely on an
informed "market" rather than our own groping in the dark to test the validity of that
decision. 101

Thus, Chief Judge Bazelon made an argument based on comparative expertise. Courts did not know much about deterioration factor adjustments,
but they certainly understood the value of procedures such as crossexamination. They might not know what a correct administrative decision
would look like, but they knew the procedures that would yield it. Accordingly, Chief Judge Bazelon called for a rejection of the clear-cut distinction between adjudication and rulemaking that stood at the center of the
APA. Rulemakings on complex, technical matters should become more
adjudicatory in nature.0 2 Indeed, this belief underlies the basis of his concurrence in InternationalHarvester. The EPA's decision should be reversed, but not because the substance of it was incorrect. Instead, the decision should be overturned because the EPA failed to follow certain

98. Id. at 652.

99. Id. at 651.

100. Id. at 652.
101. Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting)).

102. See id at 651.
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procedures-cross-examination and the obligation of the agency to respond
to particular criticisms, for example-that 0 would
have resulted in "'a
3
framework for principled decision-making.""7A
So, by the early 1970s, two answers to the question about how to reconcile the rise of rulemaking with calls for increased judicial supervision of
the administrative state had emerged. Courts could engage in intense substantive review of rulemaking, or they could eschew such review and instead demand that agencies use procedures beyond what section 553 required when they made rules. Indeed, even before the rise of hard look
review, the D.C. Circuit suggested that, in certain instances, agencies engaged in rulemaking had to provide procedures not required by the APA.
As early as 1966, the court suggested that oral hearings might be necessary
for certain rulemakings. 1' 4 In 1971, it made this requirement explicit. 05
The following year, the court dictated that the "concise general statement"
required by APA had to respond to comments submitted to the agency.' 0 6
By 1976, the court mandated that agencies give a "reasoned response" to
material critiques of its proposed rules. 10 7 After 1973, it repeatedly indicated, as in InternationalHarvester itself, that agencies should give parties
affected by rules the right to cross-examine witnesses that gave information
to the agency. 0 8 In 1977, it mandated limitations on ex parte contacts in
rulemakings, and established specific procedures for circumstances under
which such contacts could occur outside of the notice-and-comment processi19 Not one of these procedural innovations was required by the APA.
More importantly, the net result of them-namely, that agencies create a
rulemaking record-was rejected by the drafters of the APA."0 Thus, by
the middle of the 1970s, Chief Judge Bazelon's wish had come true.
Rulemakings had increasingly taken on the tone of adjudications, with the
public airing of conflicting testimony, formalized rebuttal requirements, a

103.

Id. (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d. 584, 598 (D.C. Cir.

1971)).
104. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 631-32 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
105. See Appalachian Power v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503-04 (4th Cir. 1973); Walter
Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
106. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
107. Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
108. See Mobile Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
109. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
110. See ATr'Y GEN.'s MANUAL, supra note 21, at 31 (citing Administrative Procedure:
Hearings on S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
77th Cong. 444 (1941)).
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discrete record, and, occasionally, full blown, trial-type techniques for resolving factual disputes."'
Throughout the time that these procedural innovations occurred, hard
look review continued unabated." 2 Indeed, occasionally the court justified
procedural requirements beyond the mandate of the APA by declaring them
necessary to generate a record that the court could examine with sufficient
rigor. Judge Leventhal noted in 1972's Kennecott Copper case" 3 that requiring an agency to respond to certain comments that it received might be
necessary to "enlighten the court as to the basis on which" the agency
promulgated the rule." 4 Similarly, the previous year he wrote that "the reality of an opportunity to submit an effective presentation"-in this case
the procedural requirement of an oral hearing--"[could] assure that the
Secretary and his assistants will take a hard look at the problems in the
light of those submissions."' 15 Nevertheless, as the 1970s wore on, the
judges of the D.C. Circuit began to divide into camps. One group favored
procedural restrictions on agency actions and dismissed hard look review
as inexpert meddling in the substance of administrative actions. The other
embraced rigorous substantive review and condemned the proceduralists,
accusing them of transforming the rulemaking processes into an inefficient,
judicialized mess. This division was nicely illustrated by the court's fractured opinion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA," 6 decided in 1976.
Ethyl Corp. involved the EPA regulations requiring the dramatic reduction of lead additives in gasoline."17 The Ethyl Corporation, as well as several other additive manufacturers and gasoline refiners, challenged the validity of the regulations. After a detailed review of the agency's factual
findings, a panel of the D.C. Circuit overturned the regulations finding,
among other things, that "in assessing the scientific and medical data the
Administrator made clear errors of judgement."'" 8 In a five to four deci-

111. The procedural requirements of rulemaking, circa 1977, are nicely summarized in
Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in
Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62
IOWA L. REv. 713, 731-33 (1977).
112. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (continuing the trend of
examining agency factual records in detail); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pillai
v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 485 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Nat'l Air Carrier Ass'n v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
113. 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
114. Id at850.
115. Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
116. 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976).
117. Seeid at9-10.
118. Id at66.
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sion, the court, sitting en banc, reversed the panel and upheld the regulations. All five members of the majority rejected Ethyl's arguments that the
Clean Air Act did not give the EPA the power to issue the lead regulations. 9 The majority splintered regarding Ethyl's other two arguments:
that the regulations were unsupported by the facts the agency adduced, and
that the EPA did not make relevant information available to parties who
might object to it. A three-judge plurality, Judge Leventhal along with
Judges Skelly Wright and Spotswood Robinson, upheld the EPA after a
long and detailed analysis of the studies upon which the agency based the
regulation. 12 Writing for the plurality, Judge Wright noted that a "searching and careful" inquiry into the facts was "particularly" necessary "in
highly technical cases such as this one.'121 Ethyl's procedural objections,
on the other hand, were rejected in a comparatively perfunctory manner.
Ethyl's demand for the right to cross-examine agency witnesses was summarily dismissed in a footnote. 122 Judge Wright also dismissed Ethyl's
other claims-that the EPA's decision to use new data required another
round of comments, and that the EPA was obligated, before issuing the
regulations, to identify which data it was going to rely on-as "unreason23
able" with little fanfare.'
Chief Judge Bazelon's brief concurrence 24 attacked both the plurality's
opinion and the dissent, which met Judge Wright's hard look approval of
the regulations with a similarly technical refutation. This case, Chief Judge
Bazelon argued, illustrated perfectly the problems with substantive hard
look review. Judges' lack of expertise in technical subjects meant that they
were unqualified to evaluate the administrative action at issue. 25 Furthermore, because judges were unable to truly understand the science at stake
in these cases, they would "inevitably ... make plausible-sounding, but
simplistic, judgments of the relative weight to be afforded various pieces of
technical data."' 26 Chief Judge Bazelon then quoted passages from the plurality and the dissent that purported to evaluate scientific data.'27 He then
continued, "these overt examples of homespun scientific aphorisms indicate that on more subtle, and less visible, matters of scientific judgment we
119. See id at ll-33.
120. See id. at 37-48.
121. Id. at 35 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

415-416 (1971)).
122. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 53 n.124 (denying cross-examination).
123. See id. at 51.

124. See id. at 66-68.
125. See id at 66 ("1 doubt judges contribute much to improving the quality of the difficult decisions which must be made in highly technical areas .... ").
126. Id.at 66.
127. See id. at 66 n.7.
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judges are well beyond our institutional competency.' ' 28 Nor was the
problem simply one of comparative expertise. Instead, hard look review
resulted in judicial usurpation of prerogatives of the democratically elected
branches of government. If hard look review was not "resisted, [it would]
not only impose severe strains upon the energies and resources of the court
but also compound the error of the panel in making legislative policy determinations alien to its true function."'t29 The solution to this problem, of
course, was to "improve administrative decision-making by ... strengthening administrative procedures."' 130 Since the EPA had provided interested parties with sufficient opportunities to present evidence
and rebut the
3
agency's evidence, the regulations should be upheld.1 '
Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion drew a response from Judge Leventhal.
Chief Judge Bazelon's thinking, Judge Leventhal worried, would result in

"no substantive review at all

. . .

,132

"[W]hile giving up is the easier

course," Judge Leventhal wrote, "it is not legitimately open to us at present."'133 Congress was willing to delegate broad authority to agencies because it knew that courts would review the substance of agency actions.
Congress assumed that "we can both have the important values secured by
generalist judges and rely on them to acquire whatever technical background is necessary."' 34 Indeed, Judge Leventhal pointed out that trial
court judges were routinely required to develop "sufficient background orientation"' 5 on a variety of complicated issues which crop up in litigation.
Judicial review of administrative action must be restrained, but only after
the judges had acquired enough information to figure out what was going
on. Any other approach to judicial review, Judge Leventhal believed,
was
36
no."'
abdication,
yes,
"Restraint,
intent.
Congressional
to
contrary
The acrimony evident on the court in Ethyl Corp. was only the latest
event in a dispute among the judges that had long since spilled out of the
pages of the Federal Reporter and into academic journals. Writing in the
University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review in January 1974, Judge Leventhal
37
laid out in great detail the argument he would make in Ethyl Corp.1
Though the article focused on a specific subject area-judicial review of
128. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 66 n.7.
129. Id. at 67.
130. Id.
131. See id
132. Id. at 68.
133. Id.
134. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 69.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See generally Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of
the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
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agency decisions affecting the environment-what emerged was a manifesto for hard look review. As in Ethyl Corp., Judge Leventhal argued that
hard look review was not an innovation of an activist judiciary, but was instead a legislatively mandated doctrine that was well within the traditional
ambit of courts' responsibilities. 38 Like all lawyers, judges were accustomed to acquiring knowledge of non-legal subjects during the course of
litigation. 139 In fact, by combining knowledge of general legal principles
with technical information learned for the case at hand, judges were able to
perfect balance between acquiescence and untoward judicial acstrike the
40
tivism.
Judge Leventhal then tried to demonstrate that judicial review of complex administrative decisions did not require tools that were very different
from the traditional common law methods that courts were well-versed in.
Predicting whether an industry could meet a particular environmental standard, for example, was similar to an inquiry into the possibility of "preventing or avoiding the invasion" that was routinely made in nuisance
cases. 14 1 Similarly, the use of burdens of proof, certainly a staple of the
taught legal tradition, was the way in which courts had always judged the
validity of issues with which they had only passing familiarity. 142 Finally,
he argued that courts have always had methods for tapping outside expertise in complicated cases-expert witnesses and special masters, for example.' 43 He suggested ways in which using these experts could be routinized, but the tools, he claimed, were all there.
While Judge Leventhal's piece was a defense of hard look review, it did
not have much to say about Chief Judge Bazelon's procedural critique of it.
That task was left to Judge Leventhal's colleague on the D.C. Circuit,
Judge J. Skelly Wright, the author of the majority opinion in Ethyl Corp.
Writing in the Cornell Law Review three months after Judge Leventhal's
article appeared, Judge Wright attacked Chief Judge Bazelon's "Procedural
Inventiveness" directly. 44 He began by celebrating what he called the "age
of rulemaking." 45 When an agency regulated using common law, adjudicatory methods it created "perpetual uncertainty" and assumed "the dangerous power to create new law affecting parties selected at random, or in a

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Seeid. at 515-17.
See id. at 551.
See id.at 518.
Id. at 534 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) oF TORTS § 828(c) (1939)).
See id. at 535-36.
See Leventhal, supra note 137, at 546-50.

144.

See Wright, supra note 31, at 386-87.

145. Id. at 375.
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discriminatory manner.' 46 Formal adjudication's trial-like procedures
made regulation "an advocate's game," in which legal technicalities
trumped agency expertise. 47 Fortunately, Judge Wright asserted, agencies
were moving away from adjudicatory regulation and towards consistent,
comprehensible, regulations of general applicability, promulgated through
informal rulemaking.
There was a danger, however, that the problems of adjudicatory regulation would creep in through the back door if courts attempted to judicialize
the rulemaking process. Judge Wright described the various procedural innovations that Chief Judge Bazelon and his allies on the D.C. Circuit had
foisted on unsuspecting agencies.148 This, Judge Wright believed, was
madness. First of all, it went against the Court's explicit holding in Florida
East Coast Railway that "courts are not to spin their own procedural requirements from statutory catch-phrases of uncertain meaning.", 49 Second,
Judge Wright rejected the notion that the judiciary was especially good at
determining what procedures were appropriate. In fact, he asserted, the
courts' expertise in the area of administrative procedure was an illusion.
How could they possibly know what procedures would help particular
agencies come up with a fair regulation?'5" Furthermore, deciding which
procedures were best on an ad hoc basis would result in unpredictability
and chaos. Agencies, to ensure that courts upheld their actions, would
"clothe [their] actions in the full wardrobe of adjudicatory procedure,"
thereby undermining the benefits of rulemaking and converting it into "a
lawyer's game."' 5' Ironically, the price one paid for imposing all these
procedures on agencies did not even guarantee fair administrative outcomes. Only substantive review by courts could accomplish that:
Finally, no form of procedure can ensure the minimal rationality of a rulemaker's inferences. These after all occur within his head! To see whether he has kept the counsel of reason, the reviewing court must in each instance demand an orderly explanation of the rulemaker's
For such an explanation, logic suggests no
15 2 inferences.
procedural substitute.

Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion in Ethyl Corp. was a response to both
these articles but, for a more thorough rebuttal, he too turned to academic

146. Id. at 376.
147. Id.
148. See id.at 381-84 (discussing "ad hoc" approach to procedural review adopted by
some courts that was not authorized by APA or any other statute).
149. Id. at 385.
150. See Wright, supra note 31, at 375, 387, 393, 397.
151. Id. at 387-88.
152. Id. at 394.

HeinOnline -- 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1164 2001

2001]

RULEMAKING 'S PROMISE

1165

journals, publishing two articles shortly after Ethyl Corp. was decided.' 3
In both articles Chief Judge Bazelon emphasized that public policy and
administration were increasingly concerned with scientific and technological issues.' 54 This fact created a number of problems: How were policymakers to resolve conflicting scientific findings? How much weight were
they to give to predictive, unprovable scientific theories, such as how nuclear waste will behave after 10,000 years of storage? How should society
make the value choices that stem from scientific findings-should society
prohibit the use of otherwise beneficial technology that has a remote, but
real chance of harming a certain number of people?'5 5 Chief Judge BazeIon was unsure how to answer these questions, but was emphatically sure
that courts should not answer them: "Amidst this swirling uncertainty, one
thing seems very clear. Courts are not the agency either to resolve the factual disputes, or to make the painful value choices."" 56 Because they were
not popularly elected, federal judges should not make the value judgments
inherent in these decisions. 57 Similarly, because they had no technical or
scientific expertise, they ought not15 to judge the merits of the factual findings that underlay these decisions. 8
Having determined what courts should not do, Chief Judge Bazelon
turned his attention to what they should do. He feared that the value-laden
choices that agencies made were often hidden from public view, shrouded
in scientific jargon, and buried in agency bureaucracy. This sort of agency
action would only "invite public cynicism and distrust."'159 Instead, courts
could use the APA to ensure that agency decisions were "ventilated in a
public forum with public input and participation.' 60 By doing this, courts
would reinforce the legitimacy of the system, ensure that the appropriate
institutions were making value choices, and "make intelligent public debate

153. See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977) [hereinafter Bazelon, Coping with Technology]; David L.
Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration, 52 INo. L.J. 101 (1976-1977)
[hereinafter Bazelon, Impact of the Courts].
154. See Bazelon, Coping with Technology, supra note 153, at 817-20; Bazelon, Impact
of the Courts,supra note 153, at 106.
155. See Bazelon, Coping with Technology, supranote 153, at 821, 825.
156. Id. at 822.
157. See id. at 822, 829.
158. See id. at 821-22; see also Bazelon, Impact of the Courts, supra note 153, at 107
("Significant or not, decisions involving scientific or technical expertise present particular
challenges for reviewing courts. The problem is not so much that judges will impose their
own views on the merits. The question is whether they will even know what is happening.").
159. Bazelon, Copingwith Technology, supra note 153, at 825.
160. Id. at 824. See also Bazelon, Impact of the Courts, supra note 153, at 107-08.
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possible."' 161 Courts would also force agencies to generate better public
policy because their science would be tested by62independent experts, and
their value choices judged by the public at large.
Ultimately, Chief Judge Bazelon argued, courts worked best when they
facilitated public involvement in the administrative process through procedural protections rather than by second guessing agencies themselves. He
concluded one article with a quote from John Stuart Mill: "'even if the received opinion be... the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be... vigorously and earnestly contested, it will ... be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds." ' 163 He
ended the other with a quote from Thomas Jefferson: "'I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves;
and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform
their discretion. . . ."'" For Chief Judge Bazelon, both thinkers expressed
the same sentiment. An informed citizenry, not an informed judiciary,
should be the foundation of the administrative process.
B. Rulemaking and Congress
The D.C. Circuit's debate about the appropriateness of adding procedures to informal rulemaking was not simply an intramural one. Even as
Chief Judge Bazelon tried to convince his colleagues about the need to increase the procedural requirements of informal rulemaking, members of
Congress were adding such requirements legislatively. Many of the regulatory regimes established in the 1970s rejected the simple choice between
formal adjudication and informal rulemaking. Instead, Congress required
that agencies add certain procedures beyond the requirements of section
553 of the APA, a legislative equivalent of Chief Judge Bazelon's decisions. Most of these laws, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the Federal Mine Coal Mine Safety
Act mandated oral hearings.165 Others gave interested parties a right of

161. Bazelon, Coping with Technology, supranote 153, at 825, 828.
162. See Bazelon, Impact ofthe Courts, supra note 153, at 107-08, 110.
163. Bazelon, Coping with Technology, supra note 153, at 832 (quoting JOHN STUART
MiLl, ON LWERTY 95 (1859)).
164. Bazelon, Impact of the Courts, supra note 153, at 110 (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in 7 THE WRrrNGs OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 177, 179 (H.A. Washington ed. 1855)).
165. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §§
101(f), (g) (1970), 83 Stat. 742, 745 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 811 (1994)); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 6(b)(3), (b)(4), 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 811 (1994)); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub.
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cross-examination at these hearings.' 66 Several statutes forced agencies to
make a formal record during rulemaking or created specific content requirements for the record. 67
The legislative history for the creation of these so-called "hybrid" procedures was most completely laid out during the debates over the Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975. Representatives of the FTC
and its defenders argued that additional procedures were against the public
interest because they would provide industry with methods of delaying
regulation. 168 Instead, agencies should be allowed to structure procedures
so that they were appropriate to the particular issues at hand. The Chairman of the FTC noted that the Commission frequently allowed oral testimony when appropriate and always gave a detailed explanation for each of
its rules. 169 Congress, the agency argued, echoing Judge Skelly Wright,
needed to recognize that the agency's expertise
allowed it to best strike the
170
compromise between efficiency and fairness.
Like Chief Judge Bazelon, the bill's proponents simply did not trust
agencies to make this balance in an equitable way. Repeatedly, and in the
face of constant agency objections, they insisted that trial-like procedures,
L. No. 92-573, § 9(a)(2), 86 Stat. 1207, 1215 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
2058 (1994 & Supp. V 2000)); see also Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 202(b), (c), 88 Stat. 2183, 2193-94 (1976)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §9 46, 57a (1994 & Supp. V 2000)); Toxic Substances
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 6(c)(2), 90 Stat. 2003, 2022 (1976) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1994)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§
305, 307, 91 Stat. 685, 772-77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
166. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, §§ 202(b), (c), 88 Stat. 2183, 2193-94 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 46, 57a (1994 & Supp. V 2000)); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94469, § 6(e)(3), 90 Stat. 2003, 2025 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2605
(1994)).
167. See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 9(a)(2), 86 Stat. 1207,
1215 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (1994 & Supp. V 2000)); MagnusonMoss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §
202(e)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 2183, 2195 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 57a
(1994 & Supp. V 2000)); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 6(c)(2), 90
Stat. 2003, 2022 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1994)); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 305, 91 Stat. 685, 772-77 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
168. See Consumer Warranty Protection:Hearing on H. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Financeof the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
93d Cong. 138, 154-55 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings];H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 57-58, 60
(1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7736-39.
169. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 57 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702,
7736-37.
170. See Hearings,supra note 168, at 65 (statement of Lewis Engman, Chairman of the
FTC); H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 60 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7739.
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such as cross-examination, would yield the best rules.171 Furthermore, and
again like Chief Judge Bazelon, Congress believed that adding procedures72
would allow the public to better understand what an agency was doing.
Finally, and most tellingly, the bill's supporters emphasized that courts had
a special ability-their own expertise, if you will-to determine which procedures resulted in the fairest outcomes. Consequently, making agencies
behave more like courts would result in fairer, more accurate rules. One of
the bill's chief sponsors, Representative Robert Eckhardt, a Texas Democrat, put it with admirable candor:
[Wihen I first entered into the field of study of administrative law, I used to feel,
when I was going to law school in the New Deal days, that there was no real difference between a Commission and a court, both were called upon to decide issues, assuming an equal degree of fairness in meeting that duty, that the two are the same.
But I have come to feel that there is a difference, and that difference is in tradition,
that is, a court's tradition
of due process, which frequently doesn't exist in the very
173
best of Commissions.

FTC Chairman Lewis Engman's response was essentially a concession
of defeat: "Congressman, obviously I agree with the concept of due process. You won't get me to say here I am opposed to due process. That
would be like saying I am opposed to motherhood ... ,,. Rather than
lecture the committee on the inapplicability of the Due Process Clause to
rulemaking, he simply sat silently. After all, Eckhardt's point was not that
the Due Process Clause applied to rulemaking, but that the judiciary's tradition of protecting rights through procedural innovations should be used to
control agencies that acted arbitrarily. Chief Judge Bazelon could not have
said it better.
Congress's imposition of additional procedures on the rulemaking process was not all it did to ensure judicial control of rulemaking during the
1970s. It did not limit itself to endorsing Chief Judge Bazelon's procedural
limitations on agency discretion. Many of the regulatory statutes passed in
the 1970s also mandated increased substantive scrutiny of rulemakings.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Consumer Products Safety
Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the FTC ImprovementAct, and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 each required that agency rulemakings

171. See Hearings, supra note 168, at 156-57 (statement of Mark Silbergeld, attorney,
Consumers Union of the United States); H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 32-37, 86, reprintedin
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7714-19, 7752; S. CONF. REP. No. 93-1408, at 33 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7755, 7765-66.
172. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 47 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702,

7728-29.
173. Hearings,supra note 168, at 67 (statement of Rep. Eckhardt).
174. Id at 68 (statement of Lewis Engman, Chairman of the FTC).
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be reviewed under a "substantial evidence" standard, rather than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard dictated by the APA.175 The legislative history of these acts indicates that this change was intended to increase the
intensity of judicial review of agency rulemakings. The House Committee
Report on the FTC Improvement Act was most explicit. Arbitrary and capricious review was "inadequate" for the kind of fact intensive rulemaking
that the FTC was to undertake. 76 The authors of the Consumer Product
Safety Act were equally clear. "[Substantial evidence] imposes a greater
standard of review than would normally be accorded rules or regulations
promulgated in accordance with [section] 553," commented the Senate Report. 177 The Consumer Product Safety Commission's rulemakings would
be "subjected to the stricter standard of review that is normally reserved for
formal agency proceedings .... ,,' Indeed, it was clear that the members
of Congress (or their aides) had been reading the courts' hard look opinions. The House managers of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 be-

lieved that their decision to subject EPA rulemakings to a substantial evidence standard was simply an admonition to courts to keep up the

heightened review:
[Tihe "substantial evidence" test... [is not] meant to imply criticism of the courts in
their past reviews of administrative action under the act. Those reviews have in general been thorough and searching.... [T]he purpose of the committee's provision in
this regard is to endorse the court's practice of engaging in searching review without
substituting their judgment for that of the 179
Administrator and to assure that no retreat
to a less search [sic] approach takes place.

Though the quotation marks were left out, the references to "thorough" and

"searching" mirrored language in Overton Park 80
Thus, in enacting hybrid rulemaking statutes, Congress attempted to increase both substantive and procedural review of rulemakings. Indeed,
175. Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6(f), 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7902 (1994)); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub.
L. No. 92-573, § 11(c), 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2051
(1994)); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 19(c)(B)(i), 90 Stat. 2003,
2040 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994)); Magnuson-Moss WarrantyFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(e)(3)(A), 88 Stat.
2183 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1994)); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 305, 307, 91 Stat. 685, 777-78 (1974) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994)).
176. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 33 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702,
7715.
177. S.REP. No. 92-749, at 35 (1972).
178. H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, at 38 (1972).
179. H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 323 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1402.
180. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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some legislators saw the two as intimately intertwined. Why create a hefty
rulemaking record by adding all sorts of procedures if you were not going
to ask courts to review that record in some detail? 18 ' For other members of
Congress, having both may have been an easy compromise among differing
views of how to control the administrative state. Additionally, to the extent
that Congress's goal was to rein in the executive, adding8 both
substantive
2
itself.
by
one
either
than
better
was
review
and procedural
C. Rulemaking andthe Administrative Conference of the United States
As was apparent from the FTC's objections to the procedural requirements of the FTC Improvement Act, agencies were not thrilled with Congress and the courts' tendency to proceduralize the rulemaking process.
Consequently, throughout the early 1970s, agency officials frequently attempted to stop or limit the judicialization of rulemaking. 8 3 Indeed, the
courts and Congress were not the only ones attempting to address the
problems generated by the rise of rulemaking. Federal administrative
agencies had their own voice in this debate in the form of an unusual independent agency called the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS or "the Conference").
ACUS was established in 1968 to "develop improvements in the Federal
administrative process."' 8 4 It served as sort of a think tank, empowered to
investigate how federal administrative agencies functioned and to make
recommendations to improve their efficiency and promote "fundamental
fairness" in the administrative process. 8 5 The legislation establishing the
Conference dictated that it have between seventy-five and ninety-one
members. 8 6 The president appointed its Chairman and a ten member
Council.8 7 The Chairman then appointed up to thirty-six public mem-

181. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 94-1679, at 96 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N
4539, 4581.
182. See infra notes 243-44 (discussing Congress's institutional interest in controlling

executive autonomy).
183. Informal discussions between the staff of the ACUS and various agency officials
indicated that, as of late 1975, many agencies were unaware of this judicialization or,
though aware of it, did not believe it applied to their agency. See Jeffrey Lubbers, Comments on the Past and Future Debate About Informal Rulemaking and Judicial Review
Thereof 1, 6-7 (Oct. 10, 1975) (unpublished manuscript prepared for ACUS, on file with

author).
184. 1969 ACUS ANN. REP. 1.
185. Id.at 2.
186. See id. at 49-52 (describing Conference structure through reprinting of statute

authorizing its creation).

187. See id.
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bers-mostly lawyers in private practice and academics.'8 8 The remaining
membership consisted of representatives of the various federal administrative agencies. The statute required that agency representatives always constitute a super-majority of the Conference, at least three-fifths of the membership. 8 9 Over the years the Conference divided itself into a number of
committees and employed academic consultants to produce reports on various problems with agency operations. It then made non-binding recommendations, monitored compliance with those recommendations, and issued annual reports.
Considering the dominant presence of agency personnel within ACUS,
one would expect that its recommendations would seek to preserve administrative autonomy. In fact, the institutional loyalties of the Conference
were not so simple. Although the majority of its membership consisted of
agency officials, public members (many of whom were attorneys representing regulated industries) were disproportionately represented in leadership positions.19° Additionally, law professors, who served as both public
members and consultants to the Conference, exerted a particularly powerful
influence on ACUS's work.' 91 Consequently, the recommendations that
emerged from the Conference represented an attempt to balance agency
prerogatives with the need for judicial oversight. Nonetheless, in striking
this balance, the Conference weighed the concerns of federal administrators
more heavily than did Congress or the judiciary.
The nature of this balancing act was revealed in a trilogy of recommendations on rulemaking passed by the Conference in the early 1970s. As the
Conference addressed the same issue confronting the Congress and the
D.C. Circuit-the problem of how courts were to respond to increasing
agency use of informal rulemaking-it attempted to find solutions that
would ensure some degree of procedural protection for the regulated, while
still preserving agency autonomy. Two of these recommendations, passed
in 1972 and 1976, and imaginatively numbered 72-5 and 76-3, respectively,
suggested procedures that agencies should use when engaged in informal
rulemaking. The third recommendation, 74-4, passed in 1974, attempted to
define what record a court should use when reviewing an informal rulemaking, and what standard of review that court should use.

188. See id. at 50.
189. See id.
190. The statute required that at least half the seats on the Council be held by public
members. See 5 U.S.C. § 575(b) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). Between 1970 and 1978, public
members were almost always a majority. Additionally, a majority of the Conference's
committees were consistently chaired by public members.
191. See Letter from Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ACUS staff attorney (1975-1982), ACUS Research Director (1982-1994), to the author (Apr. 2, 2001) (on file with author).
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Recommendation 72-5 sought to dissuade Congress from its tendency to
add procedural requirements to informal rulemaking in substantive statutes.
"The Administrative Conference believes that statutory requirements going
beyond those of [section] 553 should not be imposed in the absence of special reasons for doing so, because the propriety of additional procedures is
usually best determined by the agency .. . ."192 Accordingly, the Conference recommended that Congress only require hybrid rulemaking when it
had "special reason to do so," and that even in those circumstances it limit
additional procedures to requirements of oral presentation, consultation
with advisory committees, or trial-type hearings on issues of specific
fact. 193 After reemphasizing its opposition to Congressional imposition of
additional procedures, the Conference concluded by suggesting that it was
the agencies themselves who were in the best position to determine
what
194
additional procedures might be needed in a given circumstance.
The Conference's next recommendation regarding rulemaking, Recommendation 74-4, sought to clarify the record upon which courts should review informal rules and to define an appropriate standard of review. It
suggested that the record contain an uncontroversial list of documents: the
notice of proposed rulemaking, the comments the agency received, its final
order, and any other documents it relied on, as well as advisory committee
reports, and transcripts of oral hearings if the agency chose to conduct
them.' 95 With regard to the appropriate standard of review, the Conference
stated that statutes authorizing "substantial evidence" review of informal
rulemaking should be treated no differently from those that required review
under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, and that the reviewing
court's inquiry should be whether the rule was "rationally supported."' 96
Like Recommendation 72-5, each component of Recommendation 74-4
sought to protect agency prerogatives. Missing from its definition of the
appropriate record for review was any mention of documents generated by
the supplemental procedures that the D.C. Circuit had required agencies to
follow in the years before the Recommendation was issued. Indeed, ACUS
explicitly rejected the use of these procedures:
The term "substantial evidence on the record as a whole," ... should not, in and of itself, be taken by agencies or courts as implying that any particular procedures must
be followed ... and.., should not be taken as a legislative prescription that in rule-

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

1972-1973 ACUS ANN. REP. 32.
Id.
See id. at 33.
See 1973-1974 ACUS ANN. REP. 59.
Id. at 59-60.
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makin agencies must follow procedures in addition to those specified in 5 U.S.C. §
553.197

Similarly, the Conference's conflation of a substantial evidence standard
and an arbitrary and capricious standard into a single rationality inquiry,
was directly contrary to Congress's intent when it imposed the substantial
evidence standard on agency rulemaking in hybrid statutes, such as OSHA
and the Consumer Product Safety Act.'9"
ACUS issued the final part of its trilogy of recommendations on rulemaking procedures in June of 1976.199 In this recommendation, numbered
76-3, the Conference directly addressed Chief Judge Bazelon's habit of
adding procedural requirements to the rulemaking process. Recommendation 76-3 noted that, to facilitate public participation in rulemaking, agencies might wish to use procedures beyond those required by section 553.' oo
It then listed a wide variety of procedures that might accomplish that end,
many of which had already been required, in certain circumstances, by the
D.C. Circuit.20 1 However, it was the agency, the Conference emphasized,
that should be making the choice of what procedural additions were appropriate, "'each agency should decide in light of the circumstances . . .
whether or not to provide procedural protections going beyond' the noticeand-comment requirements of section 553 . . . ." wrote the Conference
quoting the language it used in Recommendation 72-5.2'2 Additionally,
agencies should only add procedures with good reason:
An agency should employ [the suggested procedures] only to the extent that it believes that the anticipated costs (including those related to increasing the time involved and the deployment of additional agency resources) are offset by anticipated

gains in the quality of the rule and in2 3the extent to which the rulemaking procedure
will be perceived as having been fair. 0

Each of these recommendations represented a compromise between conference members seeking to protect agency prerogatives and those who
wished to limit them. For example, the report that served as the basis for
Recommendation 72-5 was considerably less sanguine about informal
rulemaking and considerably more tolerant of Congressional meddling than
was the Conference's final recommendation. 0 4 On the other hand, agency
197. Id.
198. See supranotes 177-80.
199. See 1976 ACUS ANN. REP. 43 (1977).

200. See id. at 43-44.

201. See id. at 44-45.
202. Id. at 43.
203. Id. at 45-47.
204. Contrast Robert W. Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of General
Applicability: The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL.
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representatives and some academics argued, during the debate over 72-5,
that ACUS should categorically condemn any attempt at hybrid rulemaking.2°5 The final language of the recommendation, suggested by Kenneth
206
Culp Davis, sought to split the difference between these two positions.
Recommendation 74-4 was also transformed during the Conference's
plenary session. It began its life as a report endorsing several of the D.C.
Circuit's innovations that required agencies to create a specific record for
judicial review beyond what section 553 mandated.20 7 By the time it got to
the floor, these requirements had disappeared and been replaced by the uncontroversial list that appeared in the final recommendation. Indeed, during the debate several members of the Conference-most of them agency
representatives-attempted to amend the recommendation to allow the
agency to exclude from the record items it believed were not pertinent to
the rule. 208 Agencies, it was argued, should not have to do the work of
those who were opposed to a particular regulation by compiling every bit
of information they receive.209 Opponents of this amendment found it to be
a "monstrous" incentive for agencies to hide information they did not
like.2 10 As with Recommendation 72-5, the final language2 was
a compro1
1
Gellhorn
Walter
academic,
esteemed
an
by
mise, suggested
Similarly, Recommendation 76-3 was the result of a series of compromises on the floor of the plenary session. Several members of the Conference believed that the version of the recommendation that emerged from
committee seemed to require an agency to use additional procedures rather
than simply suggest that such procedures could be used at the agency's discretion.2 12 Additionally, many members were vehemently opposed to the
committee's original version, which would have established circumstances
in which allowing cross-examination was appropriate.2 13 Consequently, the
L. REv. 1276, 1313-36 (1972), with the Conference's assertion that informal rulemaking
was "simple, flexible and efficient" and that "on the whole [it] has worked well." 1972-1973
ACUS ANN. REP. 32.

205. See ACUS, Transcript of the Eighth Plenary Session (Dec. 14, 1972), at 21-24
(statement of Malcom Mason), 39-41 (statement of Walter Gellhom), 41-42 (statement of
Carl Auerbach).
206.
207.
208.
179-83,
209.
210.
211.

See id. at 32-35, 59-62.
See Verkuil, supra note 63, at 234, 238-42.
See ACUS, Transcript of the Eleventh Plenary Session (May 31, 1974), at 175,
186-87.
See id at 176-77.
See id at 181, 183.
See id at 191-93. The final language purported to relieve agencies of the burden of

tracking down every piece of information, but required them to turn over information considered by top agency officials.
212. See 2 ACUS, Transcript of the Fourteenth Plenary Session (June 4, 1976), at 65-68.
213. Seeid.at46,54,82-102.
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language in regard to cross-examination was toned down considerably, and
several of the other procedural suggestions listed were altered to accommodate the complaints of certain Conference members.1 4
Thus, all three of these recommendations were the result of a compromise among members of the Conference who had different visions of how
much autonomy agencies should have from courts and Congress. However, the bottom line, after the compromises were hammered out, tilted
strongly towards preserving agency control over their own procedures.
Each of the trio of recommendations strongly urged Congress and the
courts to defer to agency expertise on procedural matters. Indeed, on other
occasions as well, ACUS responded swiftly and strongly to specific judicial
and legislative attempts to reduce agency power. It declared the D.C. Circuit's attempt to place limitations on ex parte contacts during the rulemaking process "neither practicable nor desirable." 215 Similarly, it strenuously
objected to Congressional attempts to curb agency rulemaking discretion
through the use of the legislative veto. 2 16 Thus, ACUS staked out a position hostile to Chief Judge Bazelon's and Congress's desire to control procedures in informal rulemaking. The agencies, speaking through ACUS,
felt that control over the procedural mechanisms by which they made their
rules lay at the core of their expertise and defined the boundary of their institutional sovereignty.
D. The End ofthe Controversy
In early 1976, the Supreme Court hinted that it might share ACUS's reservations about Chief Judge Bazelon's proceduralization of the rulemaking
process. In January of that year, the Court decided Federal Power Commission v. TranscontinentalGas Pipe Line Corp.21 7 Transcontinentalinvolved the judicial review of a FPC order rejecting a pipeline company's
curtailment plan.218 The D.C. Circuit, Chief Judge Bazelon writing, required that the Commission produce a report on the pipeline company's reserves within thirty days and that it would then decide about the order. The
FPC objected, arguing that such a demand "unwarrantedly interfered with
the internal functional autonomy" of the agency. 219 In a per curium opinion, the Supreme Court agreed, demonstrating some frustration with the
D.C. Circuit's tendency to saddle agencies with specific procedural man-

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id. at 59-63, 72-76, 82-102.
1977 ACUS ANN. REP. 37.
See id. at 27-28.
423 U.S. 326 (1976).
See id. at 327-30 (discussing factual context).
Id. at 330.
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dates:
[A] reviewing court may not, after determining that additional evidence is requisite
for adequate review, proceed by dictating to the agency the methods, procedures, and
time dimension of the needed inquiry .... Such a procedure clearly runs the risk of
"propel[ling] the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for
220
the administrative agency."

Perhaps because Transcontinentalinvolved an adjudication rather than a
rulemaking or because of the extreme specificity of the D.C. Circuit's requirement, Chief Judge Bazelon did not take the Court's opinion as a hint
that it disliked procedural innovations in other instances. 221 Consequently,
the Court was forced to be more specific. The next year, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. National Resources Defense Council,222 it was.

Vermont Yankee concerned a rulemaking by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) designed to help the agency determine the environmental
impact of nuclear power plants. Environmental groups challenged the
rulemaking, and the D.C. Circuit voided it.22 Chief Judge Bazelon's
opinion for the court held, typically, that the NRC needed to provide opponents of the rule with some opportunity to challenge the testimony of the
agency's experts. 22 4 With one eye to the Transcontinental opinion, the
court declined to dictate any specific procedural requirements, but concluded that the agency "must in one way or another generate a record in
which the factual issues are fully developed."225
Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion drew a concurrence from Judge Tamm.
Citing Transcontinental,he suggested that the court simply send the rule
back to the agency because it failed, substantively, to support it.22 6 Then
quoting Judge Wright and the study of hybrid rulemaking that served as the
basis for ACUS's Recommendation 76-3, he bemoaned the "distressing
trend toward over-formalization of the administrative decision making pro220. Id. at 333 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
221. When the Vermont Yankee case reached the Supreme Court, none of the parties
tried to distinguish Transcontinentalin this way. The National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) simply did not mention the case. NRDC's amici distinguished Transcontinentalby
arguing that the D.C. Circuit had not added any procedural requirements, but had simply
remanded the case to the agency to come up with something more than conclusory statements upon which to base its decision. See Brief for 24 Named States as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 16-19, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (No. 76-419).
222. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
223. See Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
224. See id. at 653.
225. Id. at 654.
226. See id. at 661.
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cess which will ultimately impair its utility." '27 Chief Judge Bazelon, of
course, would have none of this. In a "separate statement," he vigorously
reasserted the need to require procedures beyond notice and comment in
complex, fact intensive rulemakings.22 8 In such cases, courts were "institutionally incompetent to weigh evidence for themselves." 229 Once again
(and, as it turned out, for the last time), he noted that the solution to this institutional incompetence was for courts to judge the procedures the agency
used.230
The Supreme Court was furious. In a sharply worded opinion, it reversed the D.C. Circuit. 3 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist consigned Chief Judge Bazelon's jurisprudence to the waste bin.
"[T]hat agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure," he
held, was "the very basic tenet of administrative law ... .,a32 The Court
had always held so;233 the legislative history of the APA explicitly said
so;234 and wise public policy dictated so. The D.C. Circuit's proceduralization of the rulemaking process would have a profoundly detrimental effect on the ability of the administrative state to carry out the mandates it received from Congress.
Citing Judge Wright (talk about strange
bedfellows), Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that adding procedures effectively eliminated the speed and efficiency that were the hallmarks of informal rulemaking.235 What was worse, agencies, unable to guess what a
court might require of them, would inevitably use "the full panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with adjudicatory hearings,"
rather than risk being overturned.236 Judicial review, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded, was to be substantive. The agency's rule would
238
"'stand or fall' ' 237 on the adequacy of its "contemporaneous explanation,
of its action.
Vermont Yankee ended the debate in the D.C. Circuit over the propriety

227. Id. at 660.
228. See id. at 657.
229. Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
230. See id. at 656-57.
231. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519(1978).
232. Id. at 544.
233. See id. at 543-45.

234.
235.
236.
237.

See id. at 54546.
See id. at 547.
Id.
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.

519, 549 (1978) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)).

238. See id. at 549.
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of second guessing agency procedural choices. The Supreme Court's vision of the administrative state, as manifest in Abbott Labs. and Overton
Park, dictated that courts would play a significant role in the rulemaking
process. In Vermont Yankee, the Court announced that their role would be
to engage in substantive review. For better or worse, intense, hard look review won the day. The specifics of the judiciary's role in the rulemaking
process had been defined.
This outcome seems to have been the one that the agencies preferred.
Throughout the first decade of its existence, ACUS raised only the mildest,
most oblique objections to hard look review. 239 The administrative actors
who testified before Congress regarding hybrid rulemaking statutes, such
as the FTC Improvement Act, did not even do that. Legal scholars who
had traditionally defended agency autonomy applauded Vermont Yankee.24 °
Substantive judicial review was something that agencies were used to,
while procedural innovations seemed to be novel intrusions into administrative operations. Indeed, that was the thrust of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. Chief Judge Bazelon was incorrect in stating that understanding
procedural protections was the judiciary's area of expertise. Instead, substantive review was. This was the courts' traditional role and they would
retain it, even in the face of increasingly technical, complex regulatory regimes.
The final irony of this narrative is that it illustrates a profound inconsistency in the premises of those who sought to reform the administrative state
in the 1960s. Calls for both increased rulemaking and increased judicial
oversight of the administrative process made sense before both were implemented. Each reform sought to limit arbitrary agency action. However,
as the two phenomena grew simultaneously, it became obvious that increased judicial oversight of the administrative process, whether through
substantive or procedural review, could not help but constrain rulemaking.
By empowering two different institutions to solve the problem of administrative malaise, these reforms unknowingly created a battle for supremacy
over the rulemaking process. It was a battle that the judiciary won. If the
American people needed protection from the administrative state, courts
would be their white knights, even if judicial involvement in the rulemaking process made the promulgation of rules more difficult. 24 1

239. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role in the Nuclear
Energy Controversy, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1833 (1978); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The
APA, The D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345.
241. See supra text accompanying note 1. There is a vociferous debate about the extent
to which hard look review is the cause of the ossification of the rulemaking process or, indeed, whether the rulemaking process is ossified at all. Rather than be sucked into this de-
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III. CAUSATION
The simple fact that courts were unwilling to cede power to administrative agencies did not, however, dictate the method by which they would assert that power. It was this issue that created such a controversy on the
D.C. Circuit. At first glance, the contentiousness of the debate on the D.C.
Circuit is surprising. The standard political explanations are not in the least
satisfactory. The three most vocal participants were liberal democrats of
the New Deal variety. Indeed, the two main antagonists, Judges Wright
and Bazelon, were both famous for engaging in aggressive judicial protection of the rights of minority groups: Judge Wright for the desegregation of
Louisiana public schools and Chief Judge Bazelon for the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill. 242 An examination of the subject matter of the
cases they fought about reveals no pattern. Nor do their opinions seem to
be driven by overt political concerns-a like or dislike of a particular administrative program.
This causation puzzle can be solved if we first step back and ask why the
judiciary was so intent on exerting control over the administrative state in
the 1960s and 1970s. This broader view reveals a number of factors affecting judicial decision making in this area that transcended personal policy preferences. At the heart of the debate over the proper judicial reaction
to the rise of rulemaking stood differing views of what the judiciary's institutional self-interests were. A closer examination of these institutional
self-interests reveals fissures among the various actors in this drama; fissures that explain their dramatic differences of opinion despite the common
goal of ensuring judicial control over the administrative process.
There are a number of reasons for the reassertion of judicial power over
the administrative state in the 1960s and 1970s. One reason is purely political. The statutory regimes that included hybrid rulemaking requirements
and mandates for increasingly stringent judicial review were the acts of a
Democratic Congress intent on limiting the power of the Nixon admini-

bate, I am simply making the common sense assertion that informal rulemaking is more difficult with hard look judicial review than without it.
242. For Judge Skelly Wright, see JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 112-35 (2d ed. 1990)
and J. W. PELTASON, FurY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 221-43 (1961). For Chief Judge Bazelon, see Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization,Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM, L. REV. 897 (1975); see also JUDGE DAVID

L.

BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH, HE THE PEBBLE, WE THE RIPPLES ON THE POND:

JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON TRIBUTES AND REMINIsCENCES (1993) (containing tributes to
Chief Judge Bazelon compiled for renaming of Mental Health Law Project as Judge David
L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law).
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stration. 43 For these legislators, the courts were to act as a surrogate in
their struggle with the Republican president. Similarly, conservative political opponents of regulatory regimes were happy to impede their effectiveness through the addition of procedural requirements or stringent substantive judicial review. Additionally, a history of inter-branch rivalry may
have reinforced these partisan considerations. The increasing restrictions
placed on executive action by Congress and the courts reflect institutional
reactions to a series of presidents-Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-all of
whom attempted to concentrate political authority in the hands of the executive. 4
Similarly, the dramatic increase in judicial oversight of the administrative state fit perfectly with the political culture of the time.245 The 1960s
were marked by an increasing suspicion of the political branches of government and an increasing faith in the judiciary. 246 As such, those critics
who wished to solve the problems of the administrative state through more
potent judicial review were reflecting a widespread belief that courts were
the best institution to guarantee the rights of individuals and ensure their
genuine participation in the political process. In a complex, bureaucratized
society, where agencies and the political branches were easily manipulated
by powerful interests, many lawyers, scholars, and other opinion-makers
viewed the courts as the most representative institution of government.
According to these thinkers-Anthony Lewis, Ralph Nader, Charles Reich,
and Joseph Sax were among the more famous of them--only the federal
judiciary, because of its insulation from the corrupting influences of partisan politics, could counterbalance the power of the organized interests that
dominated the legislature and the administrative state. The most famous
manifestation of this sentiment was, of course, the Warren Court, but the
increasingly heavy hand with which the D.C. Circuit treated the federal
administrative apparatus bears its mark as well.
Though convincing, these explanations for increasing judicial assertiveness only tell half the story. They do not explain why there was such conflict over the method by which the courts would police the administrative
243. See Sidney M. Milkis, Remaking Government Institutions in the 1970s: Participatory Democracy and the Triumph of Administrative Politics, 10 J. POL'Y HIsT. 51, 55-59
(1998); see also Robert A. Kagan, The PoliticalConstruction of American AdversarialLegalism, in COURTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS: JACK W. PELTASON'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO

POLITICAL SCIENCE 30-33 (Austin Ranney ed., 1996);

MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE

GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 107-15 (1988). The citizen suit pro-

visions of these statutes were another mechanism by which Congress hoped to control the
executive.
244. See Milkis, supra note 243, at 55-56.
245. i have addressed this in greater deal in Schiller, supra note 11.
246. See id. at 1421-28, 1433-35, 1440-42.
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state. Politics and political culture might explain why the judiciary came to
intervene so dramatically in the administrative process in the 1970s, but
they do not explain how. To find the answer to this question we must turn
our attention to factors that are autonomous of politics and the broader political culture. We must examine the institutional interests of the various
actors in this struggle over administrative power brought about by the rise
of informal rulemaking.
Social scientists who study the administrative state have recognized that
political and administrative institutions have interests independent of the
particular policy preferences of their constituencies. The President, for example, may want a streamlined administrative apparatus so that he can
quickly implement a broad agenda that will both appeal to the national constituencies he is beholden to and produce dramatic results that will ensure
his legacy. 47 Legislators, on the other hand, may prefer proceduralized,
balkanized administrative structures that create many opportunities for intervention on behalf of their smaller, localized constituents.2 48 Administrators themselves may have a completely different set of interests. They
may wish to preserve their autonomy to serve the public interest, further
their professional status by promoting their expertise, protect the specific
interests of the groups they repeatedly encounter, or even create new interest groups to provide them with political muscle outside of their agency.249
The clearest example of the pursuit of these institutional interests in the
context of the rise of rulemaking was ACUS's attempts to limit the judicial
proceduralization of informal rulemaking. The Conference's objections to
hybrid rulemaking were not "political" in the sense that they stemmed from
some partisan impulse. Instead, they represented the administrative state's
institutional interest in being left alone to pursue whatever policies it might
be required to undertake. Administrators during a Republican presidency
might have a different set of policy preferences than those during a Democratic one, but each wished to be left alone by Congress and the courts.
Identifying the interests of judicial actors in a particular structure of ad247. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE
GovERNMEirr GovERN? 279-81 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds., 1989).
248. See id. at 277-79. A clear and shameful example of this phenomenon was the way
in which Southern legislators used federalism to promote the interest of their white constituents in maintaining the political, social, and economic subordination of African-Americans.
See Jill Quadagno, From Old-Age Assistance to Supplemental Security Income: The Political Economy of Relief in the South, 1935-1972, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 235-63 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
249. See BRIAN BALOGH, CHAIN REACTION: EXPERT DEBATE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
INAMERICAN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER, 1945-1975 13-17, 28-29, 302-03 (1991); Moe,
supra note 247, at 282-84; James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 372-82 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
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ministrative procedure is much more difficult than finding out what political and bureaucratic actors want. Federal judges do not run for election, so
they have no incentive to create administrative law rules that might help
them intercede on behalf of particular constituencies. Nor do they have an
interest in appeasing (or antagonizing) repeat players-interest groups
clustered around a particular issue-since judges generally do not deal with
the same actors again and again, the way agencies must. Presumably, there
is an inherent judicial interest in not losing power to administrative actors,
though it is rather dilute compared to an agency's interest in seizing that
power. After all, judicial oversight of an agency may impact on a great
deal of what an agency does. On the other hand, a court that loses some of
its power overseeing agency actions still has plenty of authority over other
parts of its docket. 25) Additionally, none of the players in the D.C. Circuit's debate doubted the judiciary's interest in overseeing the administrative process. They simply disagreed about what the best way to do so was.
Of course, judges have other institutional interests defined by their relationship to the administrative state. As Nicholas Zeppos has demonstrated,
judges have an interest in promoting the forms of reasoning that they use.2 5'
Indeed, years of education and experience may convince them that legal
reasoning is the best possible method for arriving at just policy outcomes. 252 Consequently, they may wish to defend their own domain
against the less "legal" attributes of administrative governance-agencies'
scant concern for precedent or rules of evidence, for example. 2 " Additionally, like all lawyers, judges have some interest in maintaining the status of
the profession, of ensuring that disputes are resolved through the use of
lawyerly expertise.254 Clearly, these institutional interests dictate substantial judicial control of the administrative process. Indeed, they also seem to
drive Chief Judge Bazelon's vision of judicial oversight-the imposition of
procedures that made rulemaking more legalistic. Congressman Eckhardt's
lecture to FTC Chairman Engman had a similar tone.2 5 Agencies might be
good at making public policy, but courts were experts at creating proce250. During the 1960s and 1970s, administrative appeals made up around 10/ of the
workload of the U.S. Courts of Appeal. The D.C. Circuit was an exception, of course.
During the 1960s, such appeals made up about 20% of its work, rising to over 30% by the
end of the 1970s. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITCS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT
CouRT 13, 36 (1999).
251. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development ofAdministrative Law, 72 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1139-51 (1997).

252. See id.
253. See RONEN SHAmIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS INTHE NEW

100-13 (1995).
254. See id. at 131-32.
255. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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dural protections of people's liberty. This was a tradition possessed by
judges, not administrators. On the other hand, Judge Wright seemed to
disdain this legalistic tradition. Consider, for example, his fear of turning
informal rulemaking into a "lawyer's game. 256 This contrast indicates that
the judges' differing commitments to traditional modes of legal reasoning,
in and of itself, helps to explain the split on the court.
Unfortunately, the judges' beliefs in the excellence of traditional legal
mechanisms do not provide a completely satisfactory explanation for the
split on the D.C. Circuit. After all, substantive oversight of the administrative process was a traditional and very powerful weapon in the judiciary's
fight to protect lawyerly prerogatives against the onslaught of administrative government. Judge Wright argued that this substantive oversight was
257
the traditional role and that Chief Judge Bazelon was the innovator.
Similarly, as Judge Leventhal's University of Pennsylvania Law Review
article demonstrated, reference to traditional legal forms could be used to
defend invasive substantive review.2 58 Indeed, the point of Judge Leventhal's argument was to justify hard look review by invoking traditional legal mechanisms. Thus, we need to look for additional interests that influenced the judges' decisions in these rulemaking cases in order to come up
with a more complete picture of what drove Judges Wright, Bazelon, and
Leventhal. The key to this inquiry, I believe, is to examine these judges'
self-image--how they believed judges should behave.
Judges have an interest in defining and advancing their particular conception of the judiciary's institutional role in a democratic society. This is
an autonomous interest, in that it is not related to the outcome of a particular case. However, it is not, strictly speaking, an institutional interest. It
does not necessarily direct judges to protect the prerogatives of the courts
or of the legal profession. It is, however, institutionally driven. That is,
judges seek to propagate a particular vision of the judicial role when they
don their robes and view themselves not as individuals, but as members of
the judiciary. The judges of the D.C. Circuit had a self-image of what a
judge is supposed to do, how he or she is supposed to behave. Thus, each
individual judge had an interest in furthering his or her own vision of the
proper judicial role. By understanding this interest we can discover one of
the basic causes of the dispute on the D.C. Circuit over judicial review of
rulemaking.
By the beginning of the 1970s, the way in which judges defined their
own role was an issue of considerable controversy. On the one hand ex-

256. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
257. See Wright, supra note 31, at 394.
258. See Leventhal, supra note 137, at 534-36.
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isted the model of the Warren Court: judges as activist proponents of social
justice and participatory democracy. Laura Kalman has dubbed this vision
of the judicial role "legal liberalism '259 and defined it as "trust in the potential of courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about 'those specific social reforms that affect large groups of people such as blacks, or
workers, or women, or partisans of a particular persuasion; in other words,
policy change with nationwide impact. ,, 260 Legal liberalism took many aspects of New Deal and Post-War political liberalism-mildly redistributive
economics, civil rights for women and minorities, and cultural and political
pluralism, for example--and created a judicial analogue. It empowered
courts to achieve similar ends through aggressive, substantive review 26
of1
legislation and active, affirmative remedies to perceived social needs.
For a judge who defined his or her role in this fashion, "policy change with
nationwide impact" would certainly include strict oversight of an administrative state perceived by many to be incompetent, captured by unrepresentative interests groups, or both.
Legal liberalism's rival for the hearts and minds of America's judges
was also a product of New Deal political liberalism. Many New Deal liberals associated judicial activism with judicial hostility to progressive reform. 262 The judiciary had nearly crippled the Roosevelt administration,
the argument went, with constitutional objections to regulatory legislation
and heavy-handed review of administrative agencies. Consequently, after
World War I1, liberal academics and judges, many of whom had cut their
legal teeth in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, developed a jurisprudence, often known as "process theory," that sought to restrain the judiciary.
Process theory first addressed this issue of judicial restraint in the context of constitutional law.263 At its center was the idea of institutional com-

259.
260.
261.
(1995);

LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996).

Id
See id. at 49-59; GARY MINDA, PoSTMoDERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 44-47, 51-54
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.

1281, 1288-1304, 1316 (1976).
262. See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1934); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE
FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); see also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 1-43 (1998); MELV
I.
UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 668-

79(1988).
263. There has developed an extensive literature on the Legal Process Theory. See, e.g.,
NEIL DuxBuRY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JUISPRUDENCE 205-99 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, A Historicaland CriticalIntroduction to The Legal Process,
in HENRY M. HR'T, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS li-cxxxvi (1994);
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petence. The democratically elected branches should make policy choices.
Because they were unaffected by partisan political struggles, courts were
better suited for identifying the "enduring values" and "neutral principles"
upon which legislation could be judged.26 4 But judging legislation, process
theorists warned, was a dangerous business. It slid quickly and easily into
judicial legislation-the usurpation of legislative power by unelected
judges. Consequently, courts were to use a variety of procedural devicesstanding, mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, for example-to avoid striking down a law, while at the same time informing the
legislature that the law was problematic. The legislature could
then address
2 65
the policy issue, knowing what the constitutional stakes were.
The use of these procedural devices, however, was not simply a convenient tool to allow courts to lecture legislatures on constitutional issues
without actually striking down laws. Instead, these devices were central to
the judiciary's identity. Procedure, after all, was a lawyer's special area of
expertise. By respecting procedure and engaging in principled decision
making-that is, decision making based on legal, rather than personal,
principles--courts made democracy work.266 By adhering to their institutional competencies and engaging in reasoned elaboration, judges would be
"competent professionals and good democrats at the same time. '2 67 Indeed,
according to the principles of reasoned elaboration, being a competent professional-adhering to the norms of the legal profession-meant being a
good democrat: not sticking your nose where it did not belong.
This contentious debate over the proper judicial role swirled around the
judges on the D.C. Circuit. Judges Bazelon, Wright, and Leventhal were
all products of Post-War liberalism. Each graduated from law school during the New Deal, served in the Roosevelt or Truman administration, and
was placed on the federal bench by a Democratic president.2 68 Thus, the
KALMAN, supra note 259, at 22-42; MINDA, supra note 261, at 33-43; G. EDWARD WHITE,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136-62 (1978); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in
the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988).
264. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 23-28 (1962); see generally Herbert Wechsler, Towards
NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. I (1959).
265. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,
67, 77 (1961); Alexander M. Bickel and Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the
JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1957).
266. See DUXBURY, supra note 263, at 257-62.
267. WHITE, supra note 263, at 150.
268. Chief Judge Bazelon was appointed to the D.C. Circuit by President Truman in
1949, the same year the President made Judge Wright a district court judge in Louisiana.
President Kennedy appointed Judge Wright to the D.C. Circuit in 1962. President Johnson
placed Judge Leventhal there in 1965. For biographical information on these judges see the
following remembrances, published upon their deaths. See generally William J. Brennan,
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Post-War struggle between process theory and legal liberalism was the
background to their entire judicial careers. Their adherence to one side or
the other in this debate marked the main autonomous factor in the court's
administrative law decision making. How each man defined his own role
as a judge shaped how he believed courts should police the administrative
state.
Legal process theory left a deep imprint on Chief Judge Bazelon's approach to judicial review of administrative action. At the very center of his
thinking were three propositions: first, that courts did not possess the ability to judge the substance of most administrative actions;269 second, that
when courts did so, they inevitably made value judgments best left to politically responsive entities, like agencies and legislatures; 270 and third, that
by turning to their own area of expertise-procedure-courts could ensure
that agencies made reasoned decisions that could be judged by the scientific community and the public-those best suited to evaluating agency performance. 271 These postulates are nearly identical to the central tenets of
process theory. "Institutional competence," "reasoned elaboration," and
"neutral principles" were its signal phrases. By following procedural
norms-or in this instance by imposing them---courts could ensure that the
proper institutions engaged in rational decision making without overstepping the judiciary's own institutional competencies. The only values that
courts would impose were procedural ones; ones in which they were expert
in and which other institutions, particularly agencies, were thought to be
lacking.
On the other hand, Judge Leventhal and particularly Judge Wright, rejected the insights of process theory and endorsed a more legal liberal vision of the judicial role. 272 Not only could courts review technical data,
Jr. et al., In Memoriam: J Skelly Wright, 102 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1988); Warren E. Burger
et al., In Memory of Judge Harold Leventhal, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 879 (1980); Abner J.
Mikva, The Real Judge Bazelon, 82 GEo. L.J. 1 (1993); Martha Minow, QuestioningOur
Policies: Judge David L. Bazelon's Legacy for Mental Health Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 7 (1993);
Patricia M. Wald, Tribute to Judge Bazelon, 82 GEO. L.J. 19 (1993). There is also a biography of Judge Wright, ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE" THE JUDICIAL
ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT (1984). See also JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CENTER FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 242 (providing additional biographical details about
Chief Judge Bazelon).
269. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring); Int'l
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-53 (1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
270. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 67 (Bazelon, J., concurring); Bazelon, Coping with
Technology, supra note 153, at 822.
271. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 67 (Bazelon, J., concurring); Intl Harvester,478 F.2d
at 650-52 (Bazelon, J., concurring); Bazelon, Impact of the Courts,supra note 153, at 10708, 110.
272. For Judge Wright's vociferous attack on Process Theory see J. Skelly Wright,
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they were obligated to. Judicial review, Judge Leventhal scolded Chief
Judge Bazelon in Ethyl Corp., was designed to guarantee substantive values. 273 Judge Wright concurred. Procedural requirements could not ultimately ensure just agency action. Only substantive review could. 274 What
was worse, the proceduralization of rulemaking would undermine its populist, participatory potential. 7 According to legal liberalism, the judiciary
should be a direct guardian of democratic values. Surely it would fail in
that role if it could do no more than impose procedures on agencies acting
in an undemocratic, arbitrary fashion.
CONCLUSION

It is not my intent to argue that there are perfect causal links between
process theory, Chief Judge David Bazelon, and the proceduralization of
informal rulemaking on the one hand and legal liberalism, Judge Skelly
Wright, Judge Harold Leventhal, and hard look review on the other. Life
is, of course, much more complicated than that.276 Instead, my point is that
these judges could not help but be affected by the intellectual environment
in which they lived. When we ask what "caused" the debate on the D.C.
Circuit over the judicialization of the rulemaking process, we answer by
throwing a great number of ingredients into the hopper: disillusionment
with the administrative state, the rise of informal rulemaking itself, the institutional struggles among the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary,
and a vigorous debate over the proper scope of the judicial role. Each of
these things combine to yield "the cause" of the D.C. Circuit's behavior.
My point in highlighting the importance of judicial self-images to this
story is to emphasize that intellectual conceptions of judging are a significant factor in this mix. These judges were not simply ciphers for particular
Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769

(1971).
273. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
274. See generally Wright, supra note 31.

275. See id. at 387-88.
276. For example, actors on the same side of this debate had a variety of motivations.
Judge Leventhal's justification for hard look review stemmed from legislative intent, while

Judge Wright's seems to have been based on a belief in the general equitable function of the
judiciary. Compare Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("In the case
of legislative enactments, the sole responsibility of the courts is constitutional due process
review. In the case of agency decision-making the courts have an additional responsibility
set by Congress."), with Wright, supra note 31, at 394. Similarly, it would be absurd to call
Chief Justice Rehnquist a legal liberal simply because he endorsed hard look review in Vermont Yankee. Far more likely is that, as a member of the Nixon Administration, he bristled
at Democratic attempts to limit executive power during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
Vermont Yankee was his chance to strike back. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Res. Def Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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political opinions any more than they were automatons, mechanistically
discerning and implementing the institutional interests of the judiciary. Instead they sat at a time when the definition of the judicial role was a hotly
contested one. The rise of informal rulemaking and the necessity for a judicial response to it crystallized the issues in this debate. The judges on the
D.C. Circuit, thus, put the intellectual debate into action. It provided them
with vocabulary and guidance for addressing a novel legal problem and,
accordingly, allowed them to fulfill their own self-image of what it meant
to be a judge.
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